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Morse Code, Da Vinci Code, Tax Code and ...
Churches: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis
of Why Section 501(c)(3) Does Not Apply to Churches
Jennifer M Smith*
The First Amendment is often inconvenient. But that is beside the point.




Much has been said about Internal Revenue Code § 501(c)(3) and its
impact on churches. For decades, commentators have engaged in scholarly
debate about the Internal Revenue Code's (the "Code") proscription that
churches may not engage in substantial propaganda or influencing of
legislation (the "lobbying limitation") or participate or interfere in any
political campaigns (the "electioneering ban").2  In particular,
distinguished professors and other scholars have written on section
501(c)(3)'s lack of clarity and the peculiar problems, including historical
voids and constitutional encroachments, encountered in the application of
section 501 (c)(3) to churches.
3
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' Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 701 (1992).
2 See infra note 37.
3 See, e.g., Boris Bittker, Churches, Taxes, and the Constitution, 78 YALE L.J. 1285 (1969);
Wilfred R. Caron & Deirdre Dessingue, I.R.C. § 501(c)(3): Practical and Constitutional Implications
of "Political" Activity Restrictions, 2 J.L. & POL. 169 (1985); Chris Kemmitt, RFRA, Churches and the
IRS: Reconsidering the Legal Boundaries of Church Activity in the Political Sphere, 43 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 145 (2006); Patrick L. O'Daniel, More Honored in the Breach: A Historical Perspective of the
Preamble IRS Prohibition on Campaigning by Churches, 42 B.C. L. REv. 733 (2001); Reka Potgieter
Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or
Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REv. 71 (1991); Stephen Schwarz, Limiting Religious Tax Exemptions:
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Not only have scholars attempted to find solutions for the problems that
develop surrounding the application of section 501(c)(3) to churches, 4 but
all three branches of government have also wrestled with how to apply the
lobbying limitation and electioneering ban (collectively, "political activity
restrictions") to churches. Congress has unsuccessfully introduced
legislation to solve these problems,5 and the courts have failed to find
consistency in the meaning or scope of the Code's political activity
restrictions.6 Meanwhile, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") continues
to try to clarify the Code so as to apply, interpret, and enforce it with some
fairness and certainty.7 Yet, there has been little success in solving this tax
problem-America's tax problem.
At this point, no part of section 501(c)(3) has escaped scholarly
commentary.8 Nevertheless, section 501(c)(3) continues to draw attention
because of its uncomfortable and artificial interplay with churches. Due to
America's tug of war with the ever-changing principle of the separation of
church and state,9 the rise in the number of mega churches,' ° governments'
interest in securing additional funding sources," and a sitting president's
power over the IRS to ensure audits for those churches that adversely
When Should the Church Render Unto Caesar?, 29 U. FLA. L. REv. 50 (1976); Ellis West, The Case
AgainstA Right To Religion-Based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591 (1990).
4 See infra notes 269-75 and accompanying text.
5 See, e.g., Houses of Worship Free Speech Restoration Act, H.R. 235, 108th Cong. (2003); Houses
of Worship Political Speech Protection Act, H.R. 2357, 107th Cong. (2001); Bright-Line Act of 200 1,
H.R. 2931, 107th Cong. (2001); see also Ann M. Murphy, Campaign Signs and the Collection Plate-
Never the Twain Shall Meet, 1 PITT. TAx REv. 35, 36-37 (2003) (setting forth a brief history of the
recent amendment, H.R. 235).
6 Schwarz, supra note 3, at 69 ("In light of this obscure legislative history, it is not surprising that
the courts have been unable to agree on the meaning and scope of the political limitations."); see also
Edward McGlynn Gaffney, Jr., On Not Rendering to Caesar: The Unconstitutionality of Tax
Regulation of Activities of Religious Organizations Relating to Politics, 40 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 29
(1990) (noting that the Supreme Court has not squarely decided on the constitutionality of section
501 (c)(3) political activity restrictions).
7 Mark W. Everson, Comm'r of Internal Revenue, Remarks at the City Club of Cleveland, Ohio
(Feb. 24, 2006) (transcript available at http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=154788,00.html) ("Our job
at the IRS is to educate the public and charities about the law and to enforce it in a fair and even-
handed manner.").
8 See supra note 3.
9 See infra Part Ill(A).
10 A "mega church" has an average weekly congregation attendance of 2000 persons or more in its
worship services. There are over 1200 Protestant Christian mega churches in the United States and
there have been substantial increases in attendance since the 1970s. See Hartford Institute for Religion
Research, Mega Church Definition, at http://hirr.hartsem.edu/megachurch/definition.html (last visited
Mar. 5, 2007).
11 DEAN M. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHOULD NOT PAY TAXES 1 (1977) ("Tax exemption of
churches has recently become a subject of interest and controversy as municipalities and even states are
increasingly pressed for revenue.").
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interfered in presidential campaigns, 12 the attention focused on section
501(c)(3) as applied to churches is not likely to wane. Nonetheless, one
point continues to surface in discussion of section 501(c)(3): most scholars
agree or acquiesce, even if by silence, that the Code's political activity
restrictions were never directed at or intended for churches.
13
This article is about the United States federal tax code and churches. In
particular, it discusses the interplay between section 501(c)(3) and
churches in America. Section II presents a background of the history of
the tax exemption for churches and the judicial holdings relative to that
exemption. Section III explores the historical development of the
separation between church and state, tax exemptions, and section
501(c)(3). Section V analyzes section 501(c)(3) under the Constitution's
free speech and religion clauses. Section V proposes a recommendation,
and Section VI is the conclusion.
This article recommends that the government, the courts and the IRS
totally exclude churches from the political activity restrictions in section
501(c)(3). That is, leave churches alone. Do not tax them, do not regulate
the content of their sermons and do not otherwise infringe upon their
constitutional liberties of free speech and religion in any other way. Why?
Although this article will explore various reasons and rationales for its
recommendation that churches be left alone-constitutionally-based,
policy-oriented and common sense-driven-the simplest answer is that the
political activity restrictions in section 501(c)(3) were never intended for
churches in the first place, and as a result, their application to churches
ignores history and treads upon churches' constitutional liberties.
II. BACKGROUND
In the 2004 electoral cycle, the IRS, which is the organization tasked
with the initial interpretation, application, and enforcement of the Code,
14
12 See, e.g., Branch Ministries, Inc. v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The court upheld
the revocation of the church's tax exemption, finding that in 1992, four days before the presidential
election, Branch Ministries, Inc., a tax-exempt organization doing business as Church at Pierce Creek,
took out a full-page ad in two national newspapers in which it expressed concern over the moral
character of then Governor Bill Clinton, explicitly discouraged voting for Bill Clinton, whom the
church believed supported abortion on demand, homosexuality and the distribution of condoms to
public school teenagers, and concluded with the question: "How then can we vote for Bill Clinton?".
See also infra note 48.
13 See infra notes 169-70 and 198-99.
14 United States v. Euge, 444 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1980) ("As early as 1911, this Court established
the benchmarks for interpreting the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to enforce tax obligations
2007]
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received an increase in complaints about charities' alleged involvement in
proscribed political activities.1 5  This increase led to an IRS report
documenting the agency's findings and analysis of political campaign
intervention by section 501(c)(3) organizations in the 2004 electoral
cycle. 16 Following the report, the IRS concluded that the vast majority of
charities, including churches, did not engage in politicking; however, the
IRS nonetheless reported that its investigation confirmed a "disturbing
amount of political intervention in the 2004 electoral cycle.' ' 17 Thus, the
IRS committed to providing "more and better guidance and mov[ing]
,,18quickly to address prohibited activities.
Although this article could have focused on charities, in general, it
focuses on churches, in particular, because of their key role in the
foundation of American society. 19 Many of the principles upon which
American jurisprudence rests are derived from the Bible.20  Law and
in holding that 'the administration of the statute may well be taken to embrace all appropriate measures
for its enforcement, [unless] there is ... substantial reason for assigning to the [phrases] ... a narrower
interpretation."' (quoting United States v. Chamberlin, 219 U.S. 250, 269 (1911))).
15 Richard W. Gamett, A Quiet Faith? Taxes, Politics, And The Privatization of Religion, 42 B.C.
L. REV. 771, 780 (2000-01) (noting that because of the deeply-rooted belief that religion should stay
out of politics, there should be no surprise as to the frequent allegations about religious groups entering
the political fray and abusing their tax-exempt status); Press Release, Internal Revenue Service, IRS
Releases New Guidance and Results of Political Intervention Examinations (Feb. 24, 2006), available
at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=154780,00.html (The IRS examined the 2004 election
cycle and unveiled new guidelines for the 2006 election season "'following an increase in complaints
about political activities during the 2004 election cycle."); Gillian Flaccus, IRS Ensnared in Election-
Year Politics, FOXNews.com (Sept. 29, 2006), http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2006Sep29/
0,4670,ReligionlRS,00.html (reporting that the founder of the website http://www.ratoutachurch.org
referred several complaints against churches to the IRS in 2004). But see Mary Dalrymple, IRS Finds
"Disturbing" Political Activity by Charities in '04, ORLANDO SENT., Feb. 25, 2006, at Al 2 (noting that
IRS Commissioner Mark Everson explained that the amount of political intervention "is disturbing not
because it is pervasive, but because it has the potential to really grow and have a very bad impact on the
integrity of charities and churches").
16 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FINAL REPORT, PROJECT 302, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES
COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/finalpaci-report.pdf (last
visited Mar. 5, 2007) ("This report summarizes the 2004 Political Activity Compliance Initiative
(PACI) project and the results, thus far, which have been used to develop procedures for the 2006 PACI
program.").
"7 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 15.
19 In this article, "churches" refers to all places of worship, including churches, temples,
synagogues, mosques, and also includes associations of churches and integrated auxiliaries of a church.
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, PUBLICATION 1828 IRS TAX GUIDE FOR CHURCHES AND RELIGIOUS
ORGANIZATIONS 23, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
20 See John W. Welch, Biblical Law in America: Historical Perspectives and Potentials for
Reform, 2002 BYU L. REV. 611, 619 (2002) ("The Bible was nothing short of the underlying fabric
upon which American society was founded."); Mark A. Noll, The Bible in Revolutionary America, in
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religion have been intermingled since the beginning of our nation, 21 and
religious beliefs are essential in shaping public attitudes on contentious
political issues.22 In the past, churches played an essential role in
mobilizing communities to generate support for critical social causes, such
as slavery, prohibition, and birth control.23 Churches continue to play an
important role in today's important public policy issues, including
abortion, euthanasia, traditional marriage, stem-cell research, war and
peace, and immigration reform.24
Moreover, churches have also had a special role nationally and globally
in providing social services and public functions that are central to society
as a whole, oftentimes services that the government would otherwise have
to provide.25 For example, churches are often involved in providing
THE BIBLE IN AMERICAN LAW, POLITICS, AND POLITICAL RHETORIC 39-42 (James Turner Johnson ed.,
1985) (discussing the Bible's influence on the Founding Fathers).
21 STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN
POLITICS 11 (2000) ("Religion has been inseparable from American politics for as long as America has
had politics, and will likely remain inseparable as long as Americans remain religious."); BERTON
DULCE & EDWARD RICHTER, RELIGION AND THE PRESIDENCY 1-11 (1962) (noting that the question of
religion figured "prominently in an average of one of every three campaigns for the Presidency through
1960") (emphasis in original).
22 Press Release, The Pew Research Center, Religion and Politics: Contention and Consensus 1
(Jul. 24, 2003), available at http://pewforum.org/publications/surveys/religion-politics.pdf ("Religion is
a critical factor these days in the public's thinking about contentious policy issues and political
matters.").
23 See KELLEY, supra note 11, at 87 ("Throughout the history of the nation-and long before-
churches have been active in helping to shape the public policy of the commonwealth in ways they
believed God desired .... Churches were active in the effort to abolish slavery .... They have
worked for laws advancing labor organizing, woman suffrage, civil rights, and family welfare."); LEO
PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM 230, 232-33 (1953) (discussing three different strategies that
churches employed in organizing around three public issues: slavery, birth control and prohibition).
24 See, e.g., Kate Santich, Hope and Hard Work, Nuns' Efforts Aid Apopka Farmworkers,
ORLANDO SENT., July 3, 2006, at Al (discussing nuns who helped organize the largest political
demonstration in Orlando's history, a rally for immigrants' rights); Melanie Warner, With Business
Leading a Push, Liquor Comes to Dry Bible Belt, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, at Al (discussing the
opposition of churches in six Southern states to referendums legalizing alcohol sales in stores and
restaurants, where churches believe that such referendums will bring moral decay but proponents argue
that the referendums will increase the tax base and thus reduce the need to increase property taxes).
25 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (noting
that one reason why religious organizations received tax exemptions was because they "contribute to
the well-being of the community in a variety of nonreligious ways, and thereby bear burdens that would
otherwise either have to be met by general taxation, or be left undone, to the detriment of the
community"); H.R. REP. No. 75-1860, at 19 (1938) (Charitable tax exemptions are "based upon the
theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief from financial burden
which would otherwise have to be met by appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits
resulting from the promotion of the general welfare."); KELLEY, supra note 11, at 2 (concluding that a
tax exemption is an "optimal arrangement" for allowing churches to provide services and functions
critical to all of society); Leif M. Clark, Note, Church Lobbying: The Legitimacy of the Controls, 16
HOus. L. REv. 480, 481-85 (1979) (discussing the rationale for exemption of churches as one of public
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emergency rescue assistance in times of national disasters.26 They also
contribute to our educational institutions.27 Churches play key roles in
protecting underrepresented groups, such as immigrants whose legal status
may usher them into suffering in silence,28 and churches continue to
provide support to people whose addictions cause them to be marginalized
29in society. Churches' loss of their tax exemptions would likely result in
America losing a major voice, social services, and other values that
emanate from our churches.3°
The IRS and watchdog groups proffer gratuitously that if churches are
allowed to be used as arms of political campaigns and political parties,
then that involvement will "erode the public's confidence in these
institutions"' 31 and "[the church's] ability to witness to the community may
be irrevocably damaged., 32 To the contrary, if churches fail to continue to
benefit); John Witte, Jr., Tax Exemption of Church Property: Historical Anomaly or Valid
Constitutional Practice?, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 363, 388 (1991) (stating that proponents of the exemption
argued that churches "dispense social benefits through their religious activities" and "discharge state
burdens through their charitable activities").
26 See Matthew E. Berger, Will Katrina Relief Bring Faith-Based Push, JEWISH TIMES, Sept. 15,
2005 (quoting Rabbi David Saperstein, the director of the Washington-based Religious Action Center
of Reform Judaism) ("Obviously, Katrina will focus attention on the role of the faith-based community,
because they have so magnificently stepped up to the plate."); Michael Kunzelman, On Gulf Coast,
Faith-Based Groups Pick Up Government's Slack, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Feb. 15, 2006, available at
http://www.socialpolicyandreligion.org/news/article.cfm?id=3882 ("With government agencies
stretched thin by the massive scope of the Gulf Coast recovery effort, groups from every religious
denomination are shouldering a heavy share of the workload.").
27 See Steven G. Vegh, Soliciting from Local Churches is Paying Offfor NSU, HAMPTON ROADS,
Aug. 20 2006, available at http://www.hamptonroads.com (noting that despite its public funding,
Norfolk State University solicited and received over $232,500 in pledges from churches to the
University over the span of five years).
28 See Peter Prengaman, Los Angeles' Cardinal Mahony Urges Support of Immigrants, S.F.
CHRON., Mar. 2, 2006 (The leader of the nation's largest Roman Catholic diocese called on his priests
"to defy any law enacted that would try to force churches and other organizations to determine the
legality of immigrants before giving them assistance."); Teresa Watanabe, Catholic Leaders Hope to
Sway Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2006, at B6 ("U.S. Roman Catholic bishops and other
church organizations have launched a national campaign to press for new laws to promote legal status,
strengthen public opinion about the positive contributions of immigrants and organize Catholic legal
service networks to assist migrants.").
29 See Erik Eckholm, Help for the Hardest Part of Prison: Staying Out, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2006, at At (discussing the political leaders, police officers, correctional officers, churches, and
community groups working together to assist repeat drug offenders from relapsing).
30 But see DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 160 (1986) (asserting that
"[m]any of the historical welfare functions of religious groups are now transferred to the state").
31 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTIVITIES COMPLIANCE INITIATIVE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/exec summarypaci
_final report.pdf.
32 Marcus S. Owens & Douglas N. Varley, Church Electioneering: Politics and the Pulpit, at
http://www.au.org/site/PageServer?pagename=resourcespoliticsandpulpit (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
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participate fully in political discourse to advocate for social change
consistent with their teachings, they will become insignificant and their
doctrines will become meaningless.
Churches must continue to have an uncompromised voice in the
political arena. Their voices must not be influenced by fear of losing their
tax-exempt status because the sitting presidential administration approves
or disapproves of their viewpoints, because the Code is unclear, because
the Code reaches farther than congressional intent, or for any other reason.
The IRS has tried on numerous occasions to clarify the political activity
restrictions to enable churches to understand their obligations under the
Code, and the IRS is still trying to do this. 33 However, to date, it has not
been done.34
A. Case Study
At the end of the 2004 presidential election season, the IRS investigated
several churches and other tax-exempt organizations across the United
States.35 The IRS examined the churches to determine whether they may
have violated the Code and thus compromised their tax status by engaging
in proscribed political activities during the presidential campaign.36
The Code precludes churches from engaging in substantial lobbying
activity and participating or interfering in any political campaigns. In
particular, section 501(c)(3) provides tax-exempt status only to:
Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or
foundation, organized and operated exclusively for
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes, or to foster national or
international amateur sports competition (but only if no
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic
facilities or equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to
children or animals, no part of the net earnings of which
inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or
33 See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 15; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra notes 16 and
31. 34 See, e.g., Louis Sahagun, Rector Ponders Next Move in IRS Showdown, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 20,
2006, at B2 (reporting that Rev. Ed Bacon was forced to make the difficult decision of either
surrendering parish records to the Internal Revenue Service or potentially losing his church's tax-
exempt status). See also infra notes 77-83.
35 See Internal Revenue Service, supra note 15.
36 See Dalrymple, supra note 15.
Journal of Law and Politics
individual, no substantial part of the activities of which is
carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to
influence legislation, and which does not participate in, or
intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in
opposition to) any candidate for public office.37
Consider an actual IRS investigation, in which the agency investigated a
church to determine whether it had violated the political activity
restrictions by allowing the sitting President's opponent to address the
church's congregation during the presidential campaign season. In
December 2004, the IRS opened an investigation into the alleged political
activities of St. Mark African Methodist Episcopal Church ("St. Mark
Church") because of a visit by Democratic vice-presidential candidate John
Edwards during the 2004 national presidential campaign. The IRS
mailed a warning letter to the church, which stated:
Because a reasonable belief exists that St. Marks African
Methodist Episcopal Church [sic] has engaged in political
activities that could jeopardize its tax-exempt status as a
church described in section 501(c)(3) and exempt under
section 501(a),39 this letter is notice of the beginning of a
church tax inquiry described in IRC section 7611 (a).40 We
are sending it because we believe it is necessary to resolve
questions concerning your tax-exempt status as a church
described in section 501(c)(3) and in section
170(b)(1)(A)(i) of the Code.4'
Our concerns are based on a news article that appeared in
The Washington Times on Monday, July 19, 2004, which
reported John Edwards addressed the congregation of St.
Marks African Methodist Episcopal Church [sic] during a
3 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
38 Letter from Internal Revenue Service to St. Mark Church (Dec. 8, 2004) (on file with St. Mark
Church). This church tax inquiry was released and authorized for use in this article with the permission
of St. Mark A.M.E. Church, Orlando, Fla.
39 I.R.C. § 501(a) (2006).
40 I.R.C. § 7611 (a) (2006).
' I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
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church service as part of his 5 day solo campaign tour.
The article reported the following:
Democratic vice-presidential candidate John
Edwards yesterday pledged from the pulpit of a
black church that Democrats will work hard to
prevent a repeat of the 2000 election fiasco in
Florida.
"We will get voters registered. We will get
voters mobilized. We will get voters to the
polls," the senator from North Carolina told the
congregation of St. Mark African Methodist
Episcopal Church.
"The eyes of the world will be on Florida again
this year," Bishop McKinley Young said in
introducing Mr. Edwards. In five days of solo
campaigning, Mr. Edwards had been reaching
out to minorities-Hispanics in Southern
California, blacks here, as well as attending a
round of fund-raisers in an effort to raise as
much last-minute money as possible before the
Democratic National Convention next week.
Blacks, who as a group voted overwhelmingly
for Democrat Al Gore in 2000, say they were
disproportionately affected by election abuses,
including the failure to count thousands of votes,
many of them in black neighborhoods. "We will
get voters to the polls. We're going to make
sure that all those voters that go to the polls and
cast their votes, that their votes are counted this
time," Mr. Edwards said to applause and shouts
of approval from about 700 parishioners.42
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Thus began the church tax inquiry of St. Mark Church. After
conferencing with several lawyers, the church convened a legal team to
respond to the very serious allegations-after all, the loss of tax-exempt
status for any church is potentially fatal.43
St. Mark Church responded to detailed questions from the IRS about the
church service at which John Edwards spoke, which required church
members to recall the specifics of the service.44 Soon thereafter, the IRS
closed the church tax inquiry, finding that St. Mark Church did not invite
John Edwards to speak; instead, John Edwards's campaign had notified the
church that the candidate would be attending the church service on a
certain date. Moreover, the pastor of St. Mark Church explicitly stated
throughout the service that the church did not endorse candidates for
political office.45 Thus, the IRS was satisfied that the church did not
violate the Code.
Although the IRS found that St. Mark Church had not violated section
501(c)(3), it nevertheless cautioned-arguably threatened-the church that
"future violations may result in a loss of tax-exempt status or subject [the
church] to tax under section 4 9 5 5 .
"46 This IRS "caution" instilled such
fear in various church members that when a subsequent political candidate
43 See LYNN R. BUZZARD & SHERRA ROBINSON, I.R.S. POLITICAL ACTWITY RESTRICTIONS ON
CHURCHES AND CHARITABLE MINISTRIES 61 (Christian Ministries Mgt. Assn. 1990) (likening loss of
tax-exempt status to the "death penalty" for churches); Clark, supra note 25, at 480 (noting that
churches may not be able to survive without tax exemptions); Garnett, supra note 15, at 772
(determining that loss of tax exempt status to a church is detrimental); see also Jeffrey M. Berry, Who
Will Get Caught in the IRS's Sights?, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2004, at B3 (quoting Julian Bond,
NAACP Board Chairman) ("It would be catastrophic" for the NAACP [charity] to lose its tax-exempt
status.).
4 The IRS required answers to questions such as the following: "During his speech to the
congregation, did John Edwards solicit votes? Please provide a detailed explanation of his speech."
"Did the church invite any other candidate(s) seeking the same office to speak at the service held on
Sunday, July 18, 2004? If so, please provide the name of the candidate(s) and provide a detailed
explanation of what they communicated to the congregation." "When a political candidate is invited to
speak at St. Marks [sic], does the church have a policy to ensure that: It provides an equal opportunity
for all political candidates seeking the same office to speak to the congregation. It does not indicate
any support of or opposition to any candidate, and No political fundraising occurs. If so, please explain
in detail the policy." Letter, supra note 38.
45 Letter from Internal Revenue Service to St. Mark Church (Mar. 17, 2005) (on file with St. Mark
A.M.E. Church).
46 Id.; I.R.C. § 4955 (2006). This section imposes an initial tax on an organization (church or
religious organization) of ten percent of the political expenditure. If an initial tax has been imposed
and the violation is not corrected, an additional tax equal to one hundred percent of the expenditures is
imposed against the organization.
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for a local election asked to speak to St. Mark Church's congregation, the
church initially hesitated to allow the candidate to speak.47
But why did the IRS caution St. Mark Church even though it found the
church in compliance with section 501(c)(3)? Was this done to intimidate
the church? Was the IRS attempting to achieve indirectly what could not
be achieved directly? Was the IRS attempting to make the church gun shy
about accepting candidates' invitations to address the church congregation
when such action is allowable under the Code? Was St. Mark Church
targeted because the candidate who spoke was the opposing candidate to
the sitting President?
48
B. Modern Application of Section 501(c)(3) to Churches
The IRS is increasingly encouraging churches to stop engaging in
politics even though churches are merely doing what they have always
done: educating the public on issues critical to the world, the nation,
families, and individuals. But educating the public about social issues does
not mean that section 501(c)(3) has been violated, even according to the
IRS's own standards.49
Whether a church is violating the tax-exempt laws is a fact inquiry.5°
Under the Code, the IRS may initiate a church tax inquiry only if the IRS
Director of Exempt Organizations, Examinations, reasonably believes,
based upon a written statement of the facts and circumstances, that the
church "may not qualify for the exemption" or "may not be paying tax on
an unrelated business or other taxable activity." 51  Section 501(c)(3)
" Interview with St. Mark Church member (Fall 2006).
48 This IRS church tax inquiry was initiated by the IRS while the Republicans controlled the
executive branch. However, similar inquiries have occurred while the Democrats controlled the
executive branch. See Deirdre Dessingue Halloran & Kevin M. Keamey, Federal Tax Code
Restrictions on Church Political Activity, 38 CATH. LAW. 105, 123-131 (1998) (describing an IRS
church tax inquiry during the Clinton administration); see also supra note 12. But see Internal Revenue
Service, supra note 15 (reporting that the procedures in the new guidance to prevent participation in
politics and lobbying "reaffirm the agency's commitment that all examination and investigation
decisions are made in a nonpartisan manner").
" I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 89-36-002 (Sept. 8, 1989), 1989 WL 596078 ("Educating the public is
not inherently inconsistent with the activity of impermissibly intervening in a political campaign.").
50 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 16, at I ("The Code contains no bright line test for
evaluating political intervention; it requires careful balancing of all of the facts and circumstances.");
Judith E. Kindell & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, in EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
CONTINUING PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002,
at 344 (2001), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf (similarly noting that there is
no bright-line test).
"' INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 22 (outlining the audit process for church tax
inquiries in which Congress delineated special limitations for churches in IRC section 7611).
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prohibits church participation in political campaigns and restricts their
lobbying activity, as explained below.
1. Electioneering Ban
Under the Code, churches may participate in the political process but
not in political campaigns. According to section 501(c)(3), churches are
not permitted to directly or indirectly participate or intervene in any
political campaign for or against any candidate for elective public office.52
This prohibition includes making contributions to political campaigns,
engaging in fundraising, or making public statements of support or
opposition for any candidate for public office.53
However, according to the IRS, churches are permitted to participate in
activities designed to encourage people to partake in the electoral
process.5 4 If done in a non-biased or non-partisan manner, churches are
allowed to sponsor voter-registration drives and get-out-the-vote drives, to
publish voter education guides that explain candidates' positions on the
issues, and to host public forums. 55 These activities must not promote, or
have the effect of promoting, one candidate over another or opposing a
candidate or group of candidates. 6 Candidates who attend church services
are also allowed to generate support and enthusiasm for voter registration
campaigns, as Senator John Edwards did at St. Mark Church when he
encouraged voter registration in Florida.
The Code also permits churches to invite political candidates to speak at
church events if the church takes steps to ensure that it provides a fair
opportunity to other political candidates seeking the same office.57 In
doing so, the church must avoid showing bias toward any of the
candidates, specifically when introducing the candidate and in any
communications relating to the candidate's attendance, and should refrain
from political fundraising.5 8 If a political candidate is invited to speak in a
non-candidate capacity, then the church does not have to provide equal
access to all political candidates, but in that case they must ensure that no
52Id. at 5.
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campaign activity occurs in connection with the candidate's attendance and
no mention is made of the speaker's candidacy or election.59
Unfortunately, the IRS tax guide, which advises churches on how to
comply with the political activity restrictions, fails to advise them
regarding their obligations when candidates ask to speak to their
congregations, such as when Senator John Edwards informed St. Mark
Church that he would be attending its church service on a certain date.
However, there is guidance regarding the restrictions as to when churches
invite candidates to speak, which may be the more common scenario.60
Nevertheless, when candidates make a request to churches to speak before
their congregations, churches should not have the same obligations of
equal access to all political candidates, although they would have to
present the candidates in an unbiased manner, presumably to comply with
the Code.
The IRS recognizes that tax laws limiting political campaign activity
are balanced against the free speech rights guaranteed to individuals by the
First Amendment of the Constitution.6 1  Therefore, the IRS guidelines
permit ministers and other religious leaders to speak for themselves as
individuals and make personal endorsements for candidates.62 However,
ministers may not make partisan comments at official church functions or
in official church publications.63 Church leaders must clearly indicate that
their comments made as an individual, not a church leader, are personal
and do not represent the views of the church.6 4 For example, as the pastor
at St. Mark did when John Edwards came to speak, church leaders should
indicate that the church does not endorse candidates for political office.65
However, even with the all of the required IRS qualifications being
satisfied, it is difficult to divorce a church leader's endorsement of a
59 1d. at9.
60 See id. at 8; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FACT SHEET FS-2006-17, ELECTION YEAR
ACTIVITIES AND THE PROHIBITION ON POLITICAL CAMPAIGN INTERVENTION FOR SECTION 501(c)(3)
ORGANIZATIONS (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=l 54712,00.html.
61 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at pmbl. (acknowledging that Congress
enacted special tax laws for churches, ministers, and religious organizations because of their unique
status in society and their rights guaranteed by the First Amendment); Kemmitt, supra note 3, at 160
("Given the importance of the First Amendment freedoms at stake, the IRS appears hesitant to revoke
the tax-exempt status of a church in any situation which could conceivably be construed as non-
partisan.").
62 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 7 (emphasis added).
63 id.
64 id
65 See supra note 45.
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candidate as an individual from his or her recommendation to the church as
a leader.
The Code prohibits churches from supporting individuals as candidates
for public office, as previously discussed.66 However, the Code permits
church leaders to speak about important issues of public policy. 6  Thus,
pastors may continue to speak on public issues of interest to the
community. Historically, such issues have included the abolition of
slavery, gambling, child labor, prostitution, temperance, the death penalty,
war, abortion and civil rights. 68 Today, such issues may include abortion,
euthanasia, same-sex marriage and adoption, stem-cell research, anti-war
sentiment and immigration reform.69 Church leaders are permitted to take
a stand on these political issues, either in favor of or against the particular
issue, but as explained further below, this has some timing limitations.
The IRS report on the 2004 electoral cycle indicated that churches had
some difficulty understanding the section 501(c)(3) language "does not
participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of
statements), any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) and
candidate for public office.,, 70 The IRS found that churches interpreted this
prohibition to mean that they cannot expressly endorse or oppose
candidates, and thus, most of the alleged campaign interferences by
churches were indirect endorsements, which nonetheless clearly conveyed
a message in favor of or against a candidate.71
Churches may not endorse a candidate, but if a candidate is
specifically tied to certain values or issues, does the IRS consider this to be
a backdoor approach to supporting or opposing a candidate? This
delineation can be awkward and confusing for churches because there is no
clear distinction between advocacy for an issue versus advocacy in support
of a candidate. 3
66 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 60, at 2.
67 Id.
68 KELLEY, supra note 11, at 87-88; see also CARTER, supra note 21, at 20.
69 See, e.g., supra notes 22-23; see also Susan Page, Churchgoing Closely Tied to Voting Patterns,
USA TODAY, June 3, 2004, at IA, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2004-06-02-
religion-gapx.htm (noting that debates over issues such as same-sex marriage, abortion, and other
"values" issues exacerbate the divide between churchgoers and non-churchgoers).
70 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 16, at 21.
7' Id. at 22.
72 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 15, at 8.
73 Caron & Dessingue, supra note 3, at 199-200 (stating that being in favor of an issue constitutes
political alignment with the candidates who favor the same issue); Steffen N. Johnson, Of Politics and
Pulpits: A First Amendment Analysis of IRS Restrictions on the Political Activities of Religious
Organizations, 42 B.C. L. REv. 875, 882 (2001) (candidates are identified for their ideals and policy
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Political parties are usually divided in their policy positions on many
public issues. During the 2004 electoral cycle, the Republican campaign
platform included "winning the war on terror," "building an innovative,
globally competitive economy," "strengthening our communities," and
"protecting our families. 74 On the other hand, the Democratic campaign
platform included "promoting democracy, peace and security," "reforming
health care," "improving education," "creating good jobs," "standing up
for the great American middle class," and "protecting our environment.,
75
IRS guidance states that tax-exempt organizations "must avoid any issue
advocacy that functions as political campaign intervention. 76 Therefore,
presumably a church's endorsement of issues that were aligned with the
Republican campaign platform could have been construed as an indirect
endorsement of President Bush, the Republican candidate.
In one notable example, the IRS warned a large, "liberal" church that its
tax-exempt status may be in jeopardy for preaching an anti-war sermon
two days before the 2004 presidential election.77 The IRS described the
sermon as a "searing indictment of the Bush administration's policies in
Iraq."'78 Although the church and the pastor emphatically denied endorsing
any presidential candidate, the IRS was not satisfied that the church did not
violate the tax code.79  The IRS offered to not revoke the church's tax-
exempt status if the church admitted to intervening in an election, but the
church declined the offer.8°  The IRS ultimately requested all
correspondence generated by the church during the 2004 election year
stances); Kemmitt, supra note 3, at 160 (stating that there is no clear delineation between supporting an
issue and supporting a candidate and noting that there is also confusion between advocacy by
individuals within an organization and the organization itself); see also Paul Strand, Pastors May Face
IRS Over Political Squabble, CBN NEWS, http://www.cbn.com/CBNnews/politics/060203a.aspx
(clergyman complaining that the two Ohio churches sponsored events showcasing just one candidate
and were engaged in "[v]ery specific activities, a very intentional campaign to highlight, to endorse...
at least by implication ... a single candidate ... ") (emphasis added) (last visited Mar. 12, 2007).
74 Republican National Committee, 2004 Republican Party Platform: A Safer World and a More
Hopeful America, http://www.gop.com/media/2004platform.pdf (last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
75 Democratic National Convention Committee, Strong at Home, Respected in the World - The
2004 Democratic National Platform for America, http://www.democrats.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf
(last visited Mar. 5, 2007).
76 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 60, at 5.
77 Sahagun, supra note 34.
78 Patricia Ward Biederman & Jason Felch, Antiwar Sermon Brings IRS Warning, L.A. TIMES,
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which referenced any candidates. 8 After a lengthy delay, the IRS finally
sent a summons to the church and rector requesting details of the church's
policies, procedures, manuals, financial records, and other information.82
Church parishioners were disturbed that a sermon promoting the value
of peace in the midst of war would subject their church to a tax inquiry.
83
Because of the ambiguity of the language in section 501(c)(3), the IRS has
too much latitude to selectively target churches that may have criticized the
sitting administration. 84 If the church cannot publicly express its values at
a time when it is relevant-in this case, promoting peace in times of war-
then the church's speech is chilled. However, IRS Commissioner Everson
has stated that the agency follows strict guidelines involving tax audits for
tax-exempt organizations and uses career civil servants, not political
appointees, for the tax audits, and therefore any hint that the IRS is
succumbing to targeting certain organizations for political purposes is
"repugnant and groundless., 85 All Saints Church, however, has garnered
support from conservative churches, which are aware of the dangers of the
Code's ambiguous political activity restrictions language in the midst of
partisan politics.
86
Religion has traditionally represented the voice of morality, and
churches believe that this is their role in society.87  A church pastor
81 Scott Glover & Louis Sahagun, Pasadena Church May Fight IRS Summons, L.A. TIMES, Sep.
18, 2006, at Al.
82 Summons from Internal Revenue Service to All Saints Church of Pasadena, Cal., and Rector
(Sept. 29, 2006) (on file with All Saints Church) (requesting information such as financial records
related to the maintenance of the church for October 2004, correspondence between the church and the
guest preacher of the sermon in question, all vestry meeting minutes for the year 2004, and documents
reflecting payments related to the guest preacher).
83 Sahagun, supra note 34.
84 Over thirty years ago, the Senate Finance Committee stated that IRC § 501(c)(3) presented
selective enforcement problems because the standards are "too vague and thereby tend to encourage
subjective and selective enforcement." S. REP. No. 938, pt. 2, at 80 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4030, 4104.
85 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, FACT SHEET FS-2004-14, TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND
POLITICAL ACTIVITIES (Oct. 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/
0,,id=130652,00.html.
86 Lance Dickie, The Tax Man vs. Religion, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 2, 2005 (noting support to All
Saints Church from "leaders of conservative, non-denominational mega-churches who are all appalled
by what they see and can anticipate"), available at http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-
bin/texis.cgi/web/vortex/display?slug-lance02&date=20051202&query=Dickie.
87 U.S. CATHOLIC BISHOPS, FAITHFUL CITIZENSHIP: CIVIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR A NEW
MILLENNIUM (Oct. 1999) (stating that America's Catholic bishops believe that church leadership has a
moral obligation to educate Catholics on moral dimensions of public life, so that Catholics may form
their consciences in light of their faith), available at http://www.priestsforlife.org/magisterium/
bishops/faithfulcitizenship99.htm.
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preaching peace in the midst of war seems reasonable as an effort to bring
biblical values to life. Did the church violate section 501(c)(3) when its
pastor preached an anti-war sermon two days before the 2004 presidential
election in which President Bush, who supported the war, was up for re-
election? Maybe under this administration and maybe not-because of the
ambiguity in section 501(c)(3), the answer depends on the facts and who
analyzes the facts with the law.
88
Although the IRS has attempted to provide guidance to clarify the
ambiguities in section 501(c)(3), the guidance varies in its helpfulness. For
instance, the IRS offers several examples in its guides. One is the
following:
Candidate A and Candidate B are candidates for the state
senate in District W of State X. The issue of State X
funding for a new mass transit project in District W is a
prominent issue in the campaign. Both candidates have
spoken out on the issue. Candidate A supports [sic] the
new mass transit project. Candidate B opposes the project
and supports State X funding for highway improvements
instead. P is the executive director of C, a section
501 (c)(3) organization that promotes community
development in District W. At C's annual fundraising
dinner in District W, which takes place in the month
before the election in State X, P gives a lengthy speech
about community development issues including the
transportation issues. P does not mention the name of any
candidate or any political party. However, at the
conclusion of the speech, P makes the following statement,
"For those of you who care about quality of life in District
W and the growing traffic congestion, there is a very
important choice coming up next month. We need new
mass transit. More highway funding will not make a
difference. You have the power to relieve the congestion
and improve your quality of life in District W. Use that
power when you go to the polls and cast your vote in the
88 Peter Slevin, Ohio Churches' Political Activities Challenged, WASH. POST, Apr. 25, 2006
(reporting that a former director of the IRS office that regulates tax exemptions suspects that certain
conservative churches are receiving IRS favoritism under the Bush administration).
2007]
Journal of Law and Politics
election for your state senator." C has violated the
political campaign intervention as a result of P's remarks
at C's official function shortly before the election, in
which P referred to the upcoming election after stating a
position on an issue that is a prominent issue in a
campaign that distinguishes the candidates.89
This example is a clear violation of the Code, as the electioneering ban
is interpreted by the IRS, but not as the ban is drafted. To be sure, P did
not expressly tell the audience for whom to vote, but P's message in a
public speech mentioned the election and the specific issues on which the
two candidates were divided; therefore P violated the Code by inference.
However, less clear examples would have discussed the specific
obligation of churches when candidates invite themselves to address a
church congregation, which is how John Edwards came to address St.
Mark's congregation, or situations where church leaders speak on public
issues that happen to be platform issues of political candidates during an
election cycle.90  The confusion, then, appears to lie not only with
Congress's drafting of the political activity restrictions language, but also
the IRS's interpretation and the courts' enforcement of the Code. The
confusion appears to reside less with the churches, which may properly
lobby in favor of or against legislation, as explained in the next section.
2. Lobbying Influence
Churches may engage in some lobbying on behalf of or in opposition to
local, state, or federal legislation, as long as they do not devote more than a
substantial part of their overall activities toward lobbying efforts. 9' The
IRS has interpreted this language to mean that churches may participate in
issues of public policy without the participation being considered
"lobbying" if the church presents the issues in an educational context, such
as conducting educational meetings or compiling educational materials.92
89 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 60, at 6-7.
90 See, e.g., Strand, supra note 73 (reporting that clergymen filed a complaint with the IRS because
they believe that two Ohio pastors who oppose gay marriage and abortion sponsored events for the
gubernatorial candidate who opposed gay marriage).
91 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 6; Dessingue & Keamey, supra note 48, at 110
(noting that the political activity restrictions do not apply to appointed positions, such as appointment
for a Supreme Court Justice, but cautioning that the church may be subject to tax under section 527 of
the Code unless an independent and distinct fund is used).
92 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 6.
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However, churches are barred from substantially participating in
influencing legislation.93 The IRS considers "legislation" to be any action
by local, state or federal legislatures, but not actions by executive, judicial,
or administrative bodies.94 The lobbying limitation is presumably a limit
on a church's ability to influence legislation-to perhaps change laws-in
a substantial manner and obviously in a particular way. However,
churches may effect changes of law in other ways, including appearing in
court or administrative proceedings.95 Nevertheless, to determine whether
a church's attempt to influence legislation is a "substantial" part of the
church's activities, the IRS considers various facts and circumstances of
each case.96 For example, the IRS considers the time and expenditures
devoted by the church to the organization or activity, including time
devoted by volunteers and paid workers.
97
3. Fact-Driven Inquiry
Because the church tax inquiry is fact-driven, the IRS has discretion as
to how it applies the Code to tax-exempt organizations. Increasingly, the
IRS has been accused of selectively enforcing the Code against churches
depending upon the content of the speech or the activity. 99 The IRS can
9' Id. at 5-6.
94 Id. at 6 (defining legislation to include acts by local, state and federal legislatures, such as acts,
bills, resolutions, legislative confirmation, public referendum, ballot initiative, or constitutional
amendment).
95 See Thomas Troyer, Charities, Law-Making, and the Constitution: The Validity of Restrictions
on Influencing Legislation, 31 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx 1415, 1422 (1973) (comparing the law of
charitable trusts and its allowance of influencing legislation as a permissible means of carrying out
charitable purposes with tax law, and noting that before the 1934 amendments charities could use
legislative activities to advance their purposes just as if they were using any other acceptable means).
96 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 6 (referring to the "substantial part test").
97 As the IRS explained,
Churches must use the "substantial part test" since they are not eligible to use the
"expenditure test" whereby other religious organizations may elect the
expenditure test under IRC section 501(h) as an alternative method for
measuring lobbying activity. Under the expenditure test, the extent of an
organization's lobbying activity will not jeopardize its tax-exempt status,
provided its expenditures, related to such activity, do not normally exceed an
amount specified in IRC section 4911. This limit is generally based upon the
size of the organization and may not exceed $ 1,000,000.
Id.
98 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 16, at 1.
99 Liberals accuse conservatives of unfair church tax inquiries and conservatives accuse liberals of
biased church tax inquiries depending upon the viewpoint expressed by the churches. Jerry Falwell,
Barry Lynn is Trying to Scare Churches . . . Again (Jul. 22, 2004), at http://www.newsmax.com/
Journal of Law and Politics [Vol.XXIII:41
target whomever it chooses. For example, the IRS considers timing in
terms of what is within the realm of the electioneering ban. 100 Timing is
important because churches can participate in the political process, but
they cannot intervene in any political campaigns. 1 1 The IRS has stated
that timing may be a factor that it considers in determining whether a
violation has occurred, but presumably the IRS would only target a church
for violating the electioneering ban when an election was underway.1
0 2
The IRS may also be politically influenced through the referrals it
receives from watchdog groups that have emerged to monitor churches'
political activities. One watchdog group, the Mainstream Coalition, had
volunteers monitoring church services in which the sermons suggested
amending the U.S. Constitution to ban gay marriage. 103 Unless the church
service is recorded, the facts and circumstances are relayed as interpreted
by the watchdog group. 1°4 Although the IRS does its own tax inquiry,
watchdog groups refer particular cases to the agency.'0 5 That is, watchdog
organizations have their own political agenda, and thus they refer cases to
the IRS based upon the issues they are monitoring.
0 6
archives/articles/2004/7/22/103118.shtml; Press Release, Liberty Counsel Alert, Pastors Should Use a
Megaphone Rather than a Muzzle When it Comes to Political and Moral Issues (July 20, 2004),
available at www.lc.org/libertyalert/2004/la072004.htm; see also Slevin, supra note 88; John W.
Whitehead, Churches and Corrupting Influence of Politics (Jul. 26, 2006), at
http://www.rutherford.org/ articlesdb/commentary.asp?record id=292.
100 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 49.
1o1 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 7.
102 But see Clark, supra note 25, at 498 n.124 ("With respect to taking positions on candidates, it is
noteworthy that, at the time . . . John Kennedy was three years away from the next election. It is
difficult to believe that the regulations intended to stretch the meaning of 'campaign' to include the
entire period of office of a politician who may or may not run for re-election.").
103 The First Amendment Center, First Amendment Topics, Watchdog Group Monitors Politics in
the Pulpit (Jul. 20, 2004) (reporting that a hundred volunteers from the Mainstream Coalition, a
Kansas-based organization, visited area churches during June 2004 to ensure they were adhering to the
political activity restrictions regarding the debate over the definition of marriage), at
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/news.aspx?id=1 3748.
104 See Flaccus, supra note 15 (reporting that the IRS relies upon material gathered by "outsiders").
105 Id.
106 Mary Giunca, Group for Separation of Church and State Hopes to Grow, Despite its Small
Number, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 22, 2006 ("The chapter brings in speakers and members write letters
to the editor about church/state issues. During the 2004 election, the organization sent letters to all the
churches in Forsyth County, Weston said. The letter reminded churches that they could not retain their
tax-exempt status if they endorsed specific candidates from the pulpit."), available at
http://www.joumalnow.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=WSJ%2FMGArticle /%2FWSJ-BasicArtice&c
=MGArticle&cid=1 137835530133; Strand, supra note 73 (reporting that a group of Ohio pastors filed
a complaint with the IRS against two mega-church pastors for allegedly supporting a candidate for
governor who proposed an amendment protecting traditional marriage in Ohio).
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With or without the assistance of watchdog organizations, fair
application of the Code is difficult because the IRS's process assesses the
facts and circumstances of each case, which will inevitably lead to an
arbitrary and perhaps unfair application of the Code.10 7 Finally, the IRS is
limited in its resources available to fairly and effectively apply the Code's
limitation on political activity by churches and other nonprofits, which
leads to selective enforcement.
0 8
4. Penalties
Tax inquiries have a chilling effect upon churches because of the harsh
financial penalties that may result from violations of the Code and because
a tax inquiry also brings an attendant threat of litigation, and thus high
litigation costs. These chilling effects are heightened as a result of the
indeterminate outcomes of the fact-driven inquiry. That is, determining
what is and what is not proscribed by the Code is more gray than black or
white. Even with the IRS's tax guides and other interpretive guidelines,
many organizations are unaware of their boundaries in participating in
political discourse in America. 09 As a result, some churches simply opt
not to participate in America's political discourse, rather than potentially
facing harsh penalties or exposing themselves to a tax inquiry, with all of
the uncertainties and biases. Political involvement is thereby effectively
curtailed. l 0 A church that violates section 501(c)(3) may face an
107 See INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 60, at 1 (providing a fact sheet to clarify the
political activity restrictions during election season for section 501(c)(3) organizations); Beth A.
Sabbath, Tax Exempt Political Educational Organizations: Is The Exemption Being Abused?, 41 TAX
L. 847, 860-63 (1987-88) (examining the challenges the IRS faces in enforcing the lobbying limitations
for charitable organizations); see also House of Representatives Committee on Ways and Means,
Statement of James Bopp, Jr., Bopp, Colson & Bostrom, Terre Haute, Indiana (May 14, 2002)
(asserting that churches avoid addressing social and moral issues in election years because the IRS
could find that the churches' communication violated the political activity restrictions), available at
http://waysandmeans.house.gov/legacy/oversite/107cong/5-14-02/records/boppjames.htm.
108 Jeffrey M. Berry, Inquiry by IRS into NAACP Irks Nonprofits, ORLANDO SENT., Dec. 19, 2004,
at GI (reporting that the IRS's tax-exempt unit operates with just 800 employees who monitor one
million nonprofits and approximately 350,000 churches, and concluding that policing of charities and
churches with such limited resources likely results in arbitrary application of the law); see also
Sahagun, supra note 34.
109 Dalrymple, supra note 15; see also W. Peter Bums, Note, Constitutional Aspects of Church
Taxation, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 646, 680 (1973) (noting that the law was so unsettled in 1973
that a church could not know what the boundaries were, which resulted in the church not doing
anything).
110 See Bums, supra note 109, at 680. But see Schwarz, supra note 3, at 71 (suggesting that the
political activity restrictions have rarely been threatening to churches because churches either did not
participate in political pursuits or, if they did, they tied their activity in with their religious purpose).
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injunction to prohibit the proscribed conduct or speech, loss of its tax-
exempt status, and payment of excise taxes.
With respect to an injunction, the IRS may enjoin a church from making
further political expenditures or speeches, or from engaging in other
"political" activity, irrespective of whether 501(c)(3) status is revoked.''
Clearly, the notion of "free speech" is offended because the church would
be required to cease any further conduct that the IRS considered proscribed
political activity or else lose its tax-exempt status.
The Supreme Court has declared that the First Amendment protects the
four "indispensable democratic freedom[s]."1 2 One of those freedoms is
the freedom of speech. Thus, silencing the church's political speech
presumably violates the First Amendment. Moreover, this silencing would
effectively exclude the church from most, if not all, political discourse and
debate.11 3 Therefore, the vessel that has been the traditional compass of
American social and moral policy would be dead.
The IRS may also revoke a church's tax exemption for the current or
immediately preceding taxable year if the church makes political
expenditures that constitute "flagrant" violations of the prohibition against
political activities.' 1 4 Revocation prevents the church from being eligible
to receive tax-deductible contributions," 5 which would seriously hurt
churches financially. 16 Churches are not only houses of prayer, but also
provide many other social services, such as soup kitchens, schools, and
counseling facilities." 7 Revocation of churches' tax-exempt status would
presumably jeopardize these other social services as well.
The Code also allows for two tiers of excise taxes to be imposed, in lieu
of or in addition to revocation, on section 501(c)(3) organizations involved
"l I.R.C. § 7409(a)(1) (2006).
112 U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof'); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
113 Bopp, supra note 107 (arguing that Section 501(c)(3), as currently interpreted, silences churches
by preventing them from discussing social and moral issues that are at the center of public policy
debate).
114 I.R.C. § 6852 (2006).
115 See BUZZARD & ROBINSON, supra note 43, at 61; INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19,
at 11 ("When it participates in political campaign activity, a church or religious organization
jeopardizes both its tax-exempt status under IRC section 501(c)(3) and its eligibility to receive tax-
deductible contributions.").
116 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 11.
117 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) ("We find it unnecessary to
justify the tax exemption on the social welfare services or 'good works' that some churches perform for
parishioners and others-family counseling, aid to the elderly and the infirm, and to the children.
Churches vary substantially in the scope of such services.").
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in proscribed political activities."18 The first-tier tax equals ten percent of
the cost of each political expenditure, as long as the IRS determines that
the expenditure was not flagrant or willful.' 9 The second-tier tax is a one
hundred percent excise tax on the amount of the political expenditure.
This heavy penalty is imposed if the church does not correct the
expenditure within the taxable period. 20  Churches found to have
participated substantially in lobbying may lose their tax-exempt status for
that year, and thus subject all of their income to taxation.121
Finally, litigation is costly.122  The high cost of litigation is also a
deterrent that silences churches. When the IRS initiates a church tax
inquiry, the church would be wise to hire counsel to respond to the inquiry
and hopefully avoid litigation. Even if the church prevails in a church tax
inquiry and the matter never reaches a court, the church may have already
spent a significant amount of money paying lawyers to respond to the IRS
inquiry. If the church cannot recoup its costs, then the church, in essence,
loses by having to spend money to defend itself in the tax inquiry.
III. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 501(C)(3)
A. Church and State
The driving force behind the current interpretation, application, and
enforcement of section 501(c)(3) appears to be the familiar metaphor of a
"wall of separation between church and state." This metaphor is not in the
United States Constitution, Bill of Rights, or any other official government
document. 123 Nonetheless, some commentators suggest that a majority of
Americans believe that this particular metaphor rests on a firm foundation
as stated within our nation's essential documents.
124
118 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, supra note 19, at 11.
1191Id
121 Id.; Kindell & Reilly, supra note 50, at 355.
121 Internal Revenue Service, supra note 15, at 6.
122 STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 287 (6th ed. 2004) (noting that litigation is quite
costly).
123 See AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, BASIC DOCUMENTS
RELATING TO THE RELIGIOUS CLAUSES OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965) (relying upon three
documents, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, in THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 183-91 (Gaillard Hunt ed., Putnam's Sons 1900); BILL FOR ESTABLISHING
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, in 12 HENtNG STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 84-86 (1823); and Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
281-82 (Andrew Lipscomb ed., Memorial ed. 1904), to suggest support for the familiar metaphor).
1
24
See DAVID BARTON, THE MYTH OF SEPARATION 7 (1993).
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The actual metaphor originated in Protestant theology, but it is
popularly associated with Thomas Jefferson. 115 When he was president,
Jefferson used the phrase in a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association
regarding whether the federal government should establish a particular
denomination of Christianity as the nation's official denomination. 126 The
letter stated, in pertinent part:
Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies
solely between man and his God, that he owes account to
none other for faith or his worship, that the legislative
powers of government reach actions only, and not
opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act
of the whole American people which declared that their
legislature should "make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," thus building a wall of separation between
Church and State. 1
27
This "wall of separation between Church and State" language, which
referenced the First Amendment of the Constitution,2 8 was repeated by the
Supreme Court in a 1947 decision. 129 Since then, the First Amendment has
taken on a new spirit, as evidenced by the Supreme Court deciding several
cases that related to either the "Establishment" Clause or the "Free
Exercise" Clause (collectively "Religion Clauses") of the First
Amendment.13
0
125 CARTER, supra note 21, at 75 ("The true origin of the metaphor, as Mark DeWolfe Howe
pointed out in the 1960s and most legal scholars have accepted since, does not lie with Thomas
Jefferson's coinage, which occurred over a decade after the First Amendment was adopted. Rather, its
origin is in Protestant theology."); see also KELLEY, supra note 11, at 43 (suggesting that the original
wording of the First Amendment was intended to preclude Congress from establishing a national
church or interceding with the several state establishments that already existed).
126 See AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 123, at 4; KEN 1.
KERSCH, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE LAW 198-99 (2003) (noting that
the Establishment Clause was originally understood as preventing the creation of a national church);
Welch, supra note 20, at 618 (recognizing that the strict separation of church and state is "strictly a
post-enlightenment phenomenon").
127 Letter to Danbury Baptist Association, supra note 123, at 281-82 (emphasis added).
128 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
129 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145, 164 (1878)) (quoting the "wall of separation" metaphor from Thomas Jefferson's 1802 letter
to the Danbury Baptist Association).
130 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The Supreme Court has purportedly expanded the "wall" between
church and state by repeatedly invalidating state action that seemed to
endorse religion. For example, the Supreme Court has ruled that religious
instruction in public schools violates the Establishment Clause, 13 and that
applicants for public office cannot be required to swear that they believe in
the existence of God.132  The Court has also held that any kind of prayer
developed by public schools is an unconstitutional government sponsorship
of religion, 133 that posting the Ten Commandments in schools is
unconstitutional, 134 and that a nativity scene displayed within a public
building violates the Establishment Clause. 35  Additionally, the Court
declared that a student who earned a state scholarship to attend any
accredited state school may be denied the right to utilize the scholarship to
earn a theology degree, 136 and that the Ten Commandments posted in
Kentucky county courthouses violated the Establishment Clause because
the displays were installed with the central goal to advance religion.
137
However, these cases present evidence that the Supreme Court has
ignored the framers' intent with regard to the relationship between church
and state. Thomas Jefferson was president at the time when property tax
exemptions were given to Washington churches. 38 Additionally, James
Madison, who is also viewed as supporting the "wall of separation between
church and state," sat in sessions of the Virginia General Assembly when
property tax exemptions for churches were passed in the Commonwealth
of Virginia. 39 Thus, in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York,
the seminal case on tax exemptions and religious organizations, Justice
Brennan 140 concluded that neither Thomas Jefferson nor James Madison,
two prolific writers of important issues of their time,14 1 were particularly
131 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
132 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
133 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
134 Stove v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
131 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
136 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
137 McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
138 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(noting this fact as part of his analysis to infer Thomas Jefferson's stance on the separation between
church and state).
139 id.
140 KERSCH, supra note 126, at 189 (labeling Justice Brennan a "devout strict separationist" who
was also a "major force behind removing prayer from the public schools").
141 See, e.g., Walz, 397 U.S. at 684 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Fleet, Madison's Detached
Memoranda, 3 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 534, 555-562 (1946)) (noting that when Madison left office,
well after the passage of the Virginia exemption and the adoption of the Establishment Clause, he
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concerned with this idea of separation of church and state specifically as it
related to churches' tax exemptions. 142 That is, "[t]he adoption of the early
exemptions without controversy ... strongly suggests that they were not
thought incompatible with constitutional prohibitions against involvements
of church and state.'
143
Today, some people believe that the wall of separation between church
and state is a myth, 144 although others believe that it is a bedrock American
principle and that our country must ensure that this separation remains
impregnable.145 Still others regard the wall of separation as one-directional
only, protecting the church from governmental intrusion, not vice versa.
46
Others conclude that even though church and state are separated, the
church should not be prevented from influencing the state. 47 Many people
agree, however, that an absolute divide between church and state is
unsupported by history 148 and unavoidable. 149  Nevertheless, it is this
argued in an essay against tax exemptions for churches and other separations between religion and
law); AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 123, at 2-3 (noting
James Madison's leadership in formulating the religious clauses in the First Amendment); KERSCH,
supra note 126, at xv-xvi (noting that Thomas Jefferson was largely behind the penning of the core
statement of principle in the Declaration of Independence of 1776, which reads: "We hold these truths
to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure
these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed."); John C. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100
MICH. L. REV. 279, 297 (2001) (suggesting that the real development of the modem Establishment
Clause should not be fully accredited to the utterances of Jefferson and Madison, but rather in the
political experiences that made aid to religious education difficult); Murphy, supra note 5, at 43-44
(noting that after Madison left office, he penned thoughts against exemptions for churches).
142 Walz, 397 U.S. at 684-85.
141 Id. at 685.
144 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 92, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("It is
impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of Constitutional
history . . . . [T]he establishment clause had been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading
metaphor for nearly 40 years .... There is simply no historical foundation for the proposition that the
framers intended to build the 'wall of separation' [between church and state] .... ").
1
45 
See AMERICANS UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE, supra note 123.
146 See BARTON, supra note 124, at 42.
147 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, CHARITY, ADVOCACY AND THE LAW 577 (1992).
148 Jeffries & Ryan, supra note 141, at 292 (noting that when the First Amendment was adopted, no
state would have been found to be in compliance with the current understanding of separation of church
and state, except perhaps for Rhode Island; other states used various means to support Christian
religion, including government-sponsored churches); Jay Alan Sekulow & Jeremy Tedesco, The Story
Behind Vidal v. Girard's Executors: Joseph Story, The Philadelphia Bible Riots, and Religious
Liberty, 32 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 645-46 (2005) (noting that Vidal v. Girard "seriously undermines the
proposition that complete, unyielding separation of church and state is supported by this nation's
history").
149 See Walz, 397 U.S. at 670 ("Adherents of particular faiths and individual churches frequently
take strong positions on public issues including . . . vigorous advocacy of legal or constitutional
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amorphous notion of the wall of separation that is the driving force behind
the modem IRS interpretation, application, and enforcement of section
501(c)(3) with regard to churches.
B. Tax Exemptions and the Development of Section 501(c)(3)
The historical development of section 501(c)(3) provides better
guidance to assist in the modem interpretation, application and
enforcement of section 501(c)(3) than the "wall" metaphor. History shows
that churches have been exempt from sharing their income with the
government since the birth of our nation.15° For example, the 1894 income
tax specifically included an exemption for a corporation or organization
operating exclusively for religious, educational, or charitable purposes.
151
The Supreme Court struck down this statute as unconstitutional.
152
However, the church tax exemption principle survived by reemerging in
the 1913 tax act,1 53 and it has been included in every other income tax act
adopted by Congress.1
54
As shown below, section 501(c)(3) was not initially concerned with
lobbying and electioneering. Indeed, the church has always played a
pivotal role in ensuring that social issues were considered in political
positions. Of course, churches as much as secular bodies and private citizens have that right."); see
also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) ("Our prior holdings do not call for total separation
between church and state; total separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship
between government and religious organizations is inevitable."); Clark, supra note 25, at 525 (noting
the impossibility of an absolute separation of church and state).
05 Walz, 397 U.S. at 678 (stating that church tax exemptions resulted from an "unbroken" history
that "covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it"); KELLEY, supra note 11, at 70; John
W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 22 CUMB. L.
REv. 521, 541 (1991-92) (citing John W. Baker, Introduction to TAXATION AND FREE EXERCISE OF
RELIGION, PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH RELIGIOUS LIBERTY CONFERENCE viii (John
W. Baker ed., 1978); see also PFEFFER, supra note 22, at 210 (dating the history of tax exemption of
church property "at least to early Biblical days"); Vaughn E. James, Reaping Where They Have Not
Sowed: Have American Churches Failed to Satisfy the Requirements for the Religious Tax
Exemption?, 43 CATH. LAW. 29, 32-42 (2004) (setting forth the historical development of the religious
tax exemption).
' Tariff of 1894, ch. 349, § 32, 28 Stat. 556 (1894); see also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF
TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 13 (8th ed. 2003) (noting this Tariff Act provided exemption for
charitable, religious, educational organizations, and other entities).
152 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895) (holding unconstitutional the
direct tax imposed by certain portions of the Act of 1894 conceming the income of real estate and of
personal property).
153 Elias Clark, The Limitation on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities,
46 VA. L. REv. 439, 444 (1960) (citing the Tariff of 1913, ch. 16 § 2, 38 Stat. 172 (1913) current
version at 26 U.S.C. § 501(2006)).
154 Whitehead, supra note 150, at 542 (noting that the tax exemption has been included in each
subsequent income tax enacted by Congress).
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discourse. 55  For years, churches were a central meeting place for
organization and opposition to or advancement of social issues. 56 The tax
exemptions did not require churches to abstain from political activity, or to
choose between political activity and a tax exemption.'5 7 But in 1934,
Congress added a lobbying limitation to section 501(c)(3) 5 8 in an effort to
preclude wealthy donors from receiving tax deductions for advancing their
own personal interests. 59  Specifically, Senator David A. Reed of
Pennsylvania stated that contributions made to charitable organizations
should not be deductible "as if it were a charitable contribution if it is a
selfish one made to advance the personal interests of the giver of the
money."1
60
155 KELLEY, supra note 11, at 86 (finding that churches are obligated by their mission-their
obedience to God-to speak out on moral issues and that they were doing this long before legislatures
or lobbies, and they will continue to do so, irrespective of the obstacles, as long as churches exist).
156 The civil rights movement was driven largely by clergy, for example. See, e.g., CARTER, supra
note 21, at 35, 71 (recognizing that Martin Luther King, Jr., as a leader of the civil rights movement,
never tried to conceal the religiosity in his speeches and credited his Christianity for inspiring him to
lead and strengthening him to continue, and stating that many people believed that the "ideal place for
political activity is the church"); Martin Luther King, Jr., The March on Washington Address (Aug. 28,
1963), reprinted in THE AMERICAN READER 331, 333-34 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1990); A TESTAMENT OF
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 52-53, 328 (James Melvin
Washington ed., 1986).
151 See Slee v. Comm'r, 42 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930) (holding that the charity's lobbying was not an
activity that Congress intended to support by granting tax-exempt status); Clark, supra note 153, at
445-46 (citing Treas. Reg. § 45, art. 517 (1919), in T.D. 2831, 21 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 285 (1920)
(stating that "associations formed to disseminate controversial or partisan propaganda are not
educational within the meaning of the statute")) (noting that before 1934, none of the tax statutes
directly referenced political activity restrictions, but stating that cases and regulations acknowledged
that political activity was grounds for denying tax exemptions).
158 Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277, §§ 23(o), 101(6), 48 Stat. 680, 690, 700 (1934); see also S. REP.
No. 558 at 26 (1934).
1 78 CONG. REC. 5959 (1934) (Statement of Sen. Harrison) ("I may say to the Senate that the
attention of the Senate committee was called to the fact that there are certain organizations which are
receiving contributions in order to influence legislation and carry on propaganda. The committee
thought there ought to be an amendment which would stop that, so that is why we have put this
amendment in the bill."); BUZZARD & ROBINSON, supra note 43, at 37 (noting that Slee v. Comm 'r of
Internal Revenue, 46 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1930) was the impetus for lobbying restrictions); KELLEY,
supra note 11, at 70; see also Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550
(1983) (affirming that Congress enacted the 1934 limitation because it was concerned that charities
may use tax-deductible contributions to promote the private interests of the donors); Clark, supra note
25, .at 483, 488 (noting that the IRS's concern about charitable entities engaging in profit-making
activities prompted the 1934 amendment to limit lobbying); O'Daniel, supra note 3, at 758 n.l 10;
Gregory E. Robinson, Note, Charitable Lobbying Restraints and Tax Exempt Organizations: Old
Problems, New Directions?, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 337, 350 (noting Congress's concern that donors
making charitable contributions were "for lobbying purposes intended to advance the selfish personal
interests of the donors").
160 78 CONG. REc. 5861 (1934).
2007] Why Section 501(c) (3) Does Not Apply to Churches 69
The limitation was not intended to curb all lobbying activities,
evidenced by the fact that in Congressional deliberations, the phrase
"participation in partisan politics" was removed from the draft language
and thus did not become part of the 1934 amendment.' 6' The actual
language for the broad lobbying limitation was more a result of poor
draftsmanship, rather than actual policy considerations. 62 Indeed, Senator
Reed stated in pertinent part, "[W]e found great difficulty in phrasing the
amendment. I do not reproach the draftsmen. I think we gave them an
impossible task; but this amendment goes further than the committee
intended to go., 163  In drafting this amendment, Congress prohibited
"substantial" lobbying activity. However, as one scholar noted over forty
years ago, the word "substantial" is imprecise, and thus the courts have
been free to interpret it as they see fit.
164
In 1954, the prohibition against the electioneering ban was added to
section 501(c)(3) as a result of then-Senator Lyndon B. Johnson's desire to
prevent his opponent from gaining an advantage from support by private
foundations. 165 The history of this amendment is leaner than the history of
the 1934 amendment, but is sufficient enough to understand the impetus
for the amendment. 166  During the Senate floor debate, Senator Johnson
introduced an amendment to the Internal Revenue Code:
Mr. Johnson of Texas: Mr. President, I have an
amendment at the desk, which I should like to have stated.
161 H. Rep. No. 1385, at 17 (1934); 78 CONG. REc. 7831 (1934); Note, Income Tax Advantages of
Political Activities, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 273, 277 (1957) ("With the introduction in 1934 of the ban on
exemptions and deductions when any 'substantial part of the [organization's] activities ... is carrying
on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influence legislation,' Congress clearly did not intend to
affect all forms of political activity.") (footnote omitted).
162 Clark, supra note 153, at 447.
163 73 CONG. REC. 5861 (1934); see also KELLEY, supra note 11, at 70 ("But in 1934 a curious
curtailment was introduced into that arrangement-one which has since expanded and rigidified to a
degree alarming to its victims and not intended by its originators.").
164 Clark, supra note 153, at 449 ("Because the word 'substantial' lacks precise content, the courts
have been able to invoke it to liberalize the overall restriction."); see also KELLEY, supra note 11, at 72
("The undefined word 'substantial' thus stands as an enigmatic threat to any public charity
contemplating action on any legislative issue, and often has the 'chilling effect' of persuading it that the
only really safe course is to refrain from such activity entirely.").
165 HOPKINS, supra note 151, at 584 (stating that the amendment was offered out of concern that a
charitable foundation was providing funds to finance the campaign of Senator Johnson's opponent in a
primary election); O'Daniel, supra note 3, at 740 (noting that the amendment seemed to be Johnson's
way to suppress unsavory campaign tactics directed at him by some tax-exempt organization and that
Johnson was not responding to public opinion).
166 Schwarz, supra note 3, at 69.
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The Presiding Officer: The Secretary will state the
amendment.
The Chief Clerk: On page 117 of the House bill in section
501(c)(3), it is proposed to strike out "individuals, and"
and insert "individual," and strike out "influence
legislation." And insert "influence legislation, and which
does not participate in, or intervene in (including the
publishing or distributing of statements), any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office."
Mr. Johnson of Texas: Mr. President, this amendment
seeks to extend the provisions of section 501 of the House
bill, denying tax-exempt status to not only those people
who influence legislation but also to those who intervene
in any political campaign on behalf of any candidate for
any public office. I have discussed the matter with the
chairman of the committee, the minority ranking member
of the committee, and several other members of the
committee, and I understand that the amendment is
acceptable to them. I hope the chairman will take it to
conference, and that it will be included in the final bill
which Congress passes. 
167
Because Johnson's language was added to the Code without hearings,
testimony, or other comment, there is not much to glean from his addition
to the Code. 168 However, it seems clear that the intent of the drafters was
to specifically exclude churches from the political activity restrictions.
69
Indeed, commentators believe that this language was added in response to
support given by a certain private foundation to Johnson's presidential
challenger, Dudley Dougherty, in the 1954 primary election, and that the
167 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954).
169 See id.; see also HOPKINS, supra note 151, at 584 ("This provision forbidding political
campaign activity by charitable organizations was added to the federal tax law in 1954, without benefit
of congressional hearings, in the form of a floor amendment adopted in the Senate.").
169 H.R. REP. No. 83-2681, at 1 (1954); O'Daniel, supra note 3, at 768 ("There is no evidence that
a religious element played a significant part in Johnson's decision to ban certain tax-exempt entities-
including churches-from intervening in support of a political candidate. Rather, Johnson saw a cabal
of national conservative forces, led by tax-exempt educational entities fueled by corporate donations,
arrayed against him and wanted to put a stop to the meddling of these foreign interlopers.").
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language was not aimed at churches. 70  The electioneering bar was also
considered an extension of the lobbying limitation. 7 ' Thus, there is simply
no evidence of congressional intent to include churches in the political
activity restrictions.
To be sure, in 1954 this same congressional body also amended the
Pledge of Allegiance by adding the words "under God.' ' 72  The
congressional report accompanying the legislation noted that, "From time
to time of our earliest history our peoples and our institutions have
reflected the traditional concept that our Nation was founded on a
fundamental belief in God." 73 Although the amendment originated from
Congress's desire to send a message to Communist Russia, had the 1954
congressional body believed in this impregnable wall between church and
state, it seems unlikely that this body would have amended the Pledge by
adding the words "under God.'
' 74
Neither the lobbying limitation included in 1934 nor the electioneering
ban included in 1954 was specifically directed at churches, nor was either
enacted to maintain a separation between church and state. Yet both
170 Halloran & Kearney, supra note 48, at 107 (George Reedy, Johnson's chief aide, said that he
was "confident that Johnson would never have sought restrictions on religious organizations, but that is
only an opinion and I have no evidence."); Kemmitt, supra note 3, at 153 ("Whatever the reason for
Johnson's action, it is clear that his motivation was unrelated to the activities of religious
organizations."); O'Daniel, supra note 3, at 758 n. 110 (quoting Letter from Lyndon Johnson to T.R.
Bateman (May 22, 1954) (on file with LBJ Library: Dougherty, Dudley - May 1954 file) ("Yes, I have
seen the propaganda issued by the [Committee for Constitutional Government]. This organization is
composed, as I understand, of men who are against just about every piece of progressive legislation that
has been enacted during the last twenty years. I know the organization is supported by some of the
richest men in the country who are anxious to gain acceptance for their own ultra-conservative political
views. It is natural, of course, that they should oppose me.")); Schwarz, supra note 3, at 69 ("It is
understood that Senator Johnson was attempting to curb the activities of a private foundation that he
believed had provided indirect financial support to his opponent in a Texas election."). But see
Murphy, supra note 5, at 55 (suggesting that the 1954 amendment was not a way to silence then-
Senator Johnson but rather a result of the "interesting historical time").
171 Schwarz, supra note 3, at 69 (citing 100 CONG. REC. 9604 (1954) and H. CoNF. REP. No. 2543,
83d Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1954)) (stating that the 1954 amendments were intended to "extend" the
limitations of section 501 (c)(3)).
172 Act of June 14, 1954, ch. 297, 68 Stat. 249 (1954).
... H.R. REP. No. 83-1693, at 2 (1954).
174 100 CONG. REC. 8618 (1954) (statement of Sen. Ferguson incorporating President Eisenhower's
signing statement wherein he states that "this law and its effect today have profound meaning. In this
way we are reaffirming the transcendence of religious faith in America's heritage and future: in this
way we shall constantly strengthen those spiritual weapons which forever will be our country's most
powerful resource, in peace or in war."); see also Under God, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, available
at http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20040410-114513-5006r.htm ("Congress added the phrase 'under
God' to the pledge in 1954, meaning to distinguish clearly between the religious heritage of the United
States and the atheistic principles of Communism.").
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limitations are rigidly enforced against churches today under the modem
development of the "wall between church and state."
175
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 501 (c)(3)
A. Freedom of Speech
Although some scholars believe that contemporary free speech has
developed into a quagmire of doctrinal complexity,' 76 one point is clear:
political speech, including political contributions, is "high-value" speech
and should therefore be accorded the highest protections of strict scrutiny
under the First Amendment. 177 In fact, the Court is very critical of content-
based regulations of political speech because they "distort the proper
functioning of the marketplace of ideas.' 78  Most recently, in Randall v.
Sorrel 7 9 the Court affirmed the seminal authority with regard to campaign
finance regulations, Buckley v. Valeo, which held that political
contributions are a form of constitutionally protected speech.18
0
Buckley v. Valeo applied the Court's strict scrutiny test and determined
that political contributions-the amount that candidates for office may
spend on their campaigns ("expenditure limits") and the amount that
individuals, organizations, and political parties may contribute to those
campaigns ("contribution limits")-implicate fundamental First
Amendment interests, namely the freedoms of political expression and
175 Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax "Benefits "for Religious Institutions Constitutionally Dependent
on Benefits for Secular Entities?, 42 B.C. L. REv. 805, 840 (2001) (citing Diamond, Efficiency and
Benevolence: Philanthropic Tax Exemptions in Nineteenth Century America, in PROPERTY-TAX
EXEMPTION FOR CHARITIES: MAPPING THE BATTLEFIELD (Evelyn Brody ed., 2001) (stating that
because of "the irregular nature of taxation in colonial times," tax exemptions are viewed differently
then than now)).
176 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (acknowledging that First Amendment jurisprudence is "muddied waters");
KERSCH, supra note 126, at 36 ("Contemporary free speech law has grown into a tangled garden of
bewildering doctrinal complexity.").
177 KERSCH, supra note 126, at 206 (explaining that high-value speech includes political speech and
"stands at the core of the First Amendment").
"8 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (stating that the general advocacy of
ideas is protected under the constitution as part of the nation's "profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"); KERSCH, supra
note 126, at 195.
179 Randall v. Sorrell, 126 S. Ct. 2479 (2006).
180 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). But see Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and
Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663, 664 (1997) (arguing that "the better way to resolve the
anomalies created by Buckley v. Valeo may well be not to impose new expenditure limits on political
campaigns but rather to eliminate contribution limits").
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political association. 18' Nonetheless, the Court treated expenditure limits
differently than contribution limits because it found that the restrictions
involved in the limits were different. The Court found that expenditure
limits reduced "the quantity of expression by restricting the number of
issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached" in violation of the First Amendment.18 2 On the other hand, the
Court held that although contribution limits were a "marginal restriction
upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication," they
nevertheless left the contributor "freedom to discuss candidates and
issues." 183  The Court held that the contribution limits were "closely
drawn" to a sufficiently significant interest-preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption in federal elections. 8 4 That is, the government
interest in avoiding corruption or its appearance was sufficient to impose
contribution limits.
Thirty years later, the Court had an opportunity to overrule Buckley but
declined to do so. In Randall v. Sorrell, voters, campaign contributors,
political candidates, and political parties sued state officials who were
responsible for enforcing Vermont Act 64, which included low expenditure
limits and contribution limits. 85 With regard to the expenditure limits, the
Court noted that, like those in Buckley, the limits consisted of a dollar limit
imposed upon a candidate's expenditures. 86  Also similar to Buckley,
Vermont's rationale for imposing the limits under Act 64 were similar to
Congress's rationale for the Buckley limits: preventing corruption or the
appearance thereof' 87 Thus, the court followed Buckley and its progeny
and held that Act 64's expenditure limits violate the First Amendment.
88
With respect to the contribution limits, however, the Court held that they
were not "closely drawn" because they were so low as to "work more harm
to protect First Amendment interests then their anticorruption objectives
could justify."' 89  Thus, political contributions-both expenditure limits
and contributions limits-are protected under the First Amendment.
181 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15.
182 Id. at 19.
83 Id. at 20-21.
' Id. at 55.
185 Randall, 126 S.Ct. at 2485-86.
116 Id. at 2486.
8.7 Id. at 2492.
88. Id. at 2500.
"
8 9 Id. at 2491-92.
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Like political contributions, lobbying of legislators is also protected
under the First Amendment. 90 However, the Court has nevertheless
allowed Congress to restrict churches' right to engage in political speech-
this high-value speech. Why? In Regan v. Taxation With
Representation,'91 the Court held that statutes may be held to a higher level
of scrutiny if they infringe upon a fundamental right, such as free speech.
However, the Court also stated that "a legislature's decision not to
subsidize the exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right,
and thus, is not subject to strict scrutiny."' 92 But Regan seems misplaced
as applied to section 501(c)(3) and churches.
193
In Regan, the organization Taxation With Representation ("TWR")
proposed to advocate its viewpoint before Congress, the Judiciary, and the
Executive Branch by influencing legislation.' 94  When TWR applied for
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3), the IRS denied the application
because it determined that a substantial part of TWR's activities would
consist of attempting to influence legislation in violation of section
501(c)(3).' 95 TWR responded by attacking the lobbying limitation in
section 501(c)(3) as a violation of the First Amendment and the Fifth
Amendment's equal protection clause.
196
Regan seems misplaced for several reasons. Regan, which involved a
charitable organization, not a church, stated that the legislature could
decide that it did not want to subsidize substantial lobbying by charities.
However, history demonstrates that the legislature never intended to apply
section 501(c)(3) restrictions to churches. 197 As shown earlier, at the time
when the 1934 and 1954 amendments were enacted, churches were heavily
190 Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Pearson, 390 F.2d 489, 491 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("While the term 'lobbyist'
has become encrusted with invidious connotations, every person or group engaged, as this one
allegedly has been, in trying to persuade Congressional action is exercising the First Amendment right
of petition.").
191 Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
'92 Id. at 549.
'93 Id. at 545-46 (holding that the lobbying restriction, as opposed to the electioneering ban, did not
place a content-based restriction on speech); see also Gaffney, supra note 6, at 32-33 (noting that the
subsidy argument is weak because (1) the Court has determined that the government may not "purchase
one's constitutional rights by extending a grant under the spending power," (2) Regan ignores
precedential authority in Walz, where the Court rejected the idea that property tax exemptions were
impermissible subsidies, and (3) Regan did not involve a religious group trying to advance a religious
message on issues of public concern).
'94 Regan, 461 U.S. at 541-42.




See supra Part 111(B).
[Vol.XXIII:41
2007] Why Section 501(c) (3) Does Not Apply to Churches 75
interwoven in every aspect of politics. There was no decision on
Congress's part to include churches within the political activity restrictions
of section 501(c)(3). To the contrary, Congress specifically decided to
exclude churches from the political activity restrictions. The legislative
history seems quite clear:
We have limited ourselves in the scope of our inquiry, in
order not to scatter over the entire, gigantic field. We
urge, however, that the proposed continued inquiry cover
those sections which we have perforce omitted. Among
them is that of organizations which have religious names,
or some connection with religion or a religious group,
which have engaged in political activity. There is
evidence that such groups exist in all three major sects.
The right of a minister, priest or rabbi to engage in
political activity is clear enough. When such activity takes
place, however, under the shelter of a tax-exempt
organization which is not in itself a church, we question its
permissibility.19 8
Churches were never intended to be excluded from full, active
participation in the political process. 199 Instead, the legislators serving
during the time when the 1954 amendment was enacted clearly intended to
exclude churches from political activity restrictions. Congress decided not
to subsidize charities, but it did not decide this with respect to churches.
Thus the subsidy argument, as set out in Regan, applied to a charity, not a
church. As applied to churches, therefore, the subsidy argument is
historically unsound.2 °°
Moreover, the subsidy argument is unconvincing and violates the First
Amendment when applied to churches because unlike other charitable
19' H.R. REP. No. 83-2681, at 1, 220-21 (1954) (emphasis added); see also Murphy, supra note 5,
at 53 (acknowledging that the majority of the Committee "had no qualms about churches, and only
churches, having some political power").
199 O'Daniel, supra note 3, at 768 (noting that there was no evidence that Johnson intended to
include churches in his 1954 amendment to ban tax-exempt organizations from interfering in political
campaigns).
200 KELLEY, supra note 11, at 11 (arguing that treating exemptions as "subsidies" ignores the
history of exemptions in federal tax law).
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organizations, churches are dually protected under the Religion Clauses.2 '
That is, churches have more constitutional protections than other
202charities. They have the additional right to be free from unconstitutional
entanglement with the state: entanglement between church and state "must
be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of the Establishment Clause," according
to a recent Supreme Court opinion.20 3 Years ago, the Supreme Court
acknowledged in Walz that taxation or exemption of churches "occasions
some degree of involvement with religion," but that "[g]ranting tax
exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic
benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than
taxing them."204  The Walz Court analyzed taxation and exemption by
considering "whether the involvement is excessive" and whether it calls for
"official and continuing surveillance [by the government] leading to an
impermissible degree of entanglement., 20 5  The Court concluded that "a
direct money subsidy would be a relationship pregnant with involvement,"
and would likely also require detailed administrative oversight, but that
"[t]he grant of a tax exemption is not sponsorship since the government
does not transfer part of its revenue to churches but simply abstains from
demanding that the church support the state. 20 6
The Regan Court held that a tax exemption to a charity was equivalent
to a subsidy.2°7 However, as the Walz Court had earlier stated with regard
to church exemptions, exempting churches from taxation is a lesser form of
entanglement than a subsidy would be. Thus, the subsidy argument
advanced in Regan for a charity lacks the dual protections afforded to
churches.
201 See Bittker, supra note 3, at 1290 (warning that once tax exemptions became treated as
privileges or gifts from the legislature, they would be one step from being labeled a "loophole,"
"preference," and "subsidy"); Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49
SYRACUSE L. REV. 971, 993 (1999) (discouraging the current tendency of courts to casually refer to tax
exemptions as "subsidies" without considering that when viewed as subsidies, tax exemptions become
the same as cash and thus unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause); Zelinsky, supra note 175,
at 838-841 (arguing that tax benefits should not be viewed as "subsidies of the sectarian" but that the
First Amendment is "best understood as permitting governments to refrain from taxation to
accommodate the autonomy of religious actors and activities," and thus a "tax exemption does not
subsidize churches, but leaves them alone").
202 Gaffney, supra note 6, at 35 (noting that religious bodies are afforded additional constitutional
protection because of their religious nature).
203 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
204 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970).
205 Id. at 675.
206 Id.
207 Regan, 461 U.S. at 545-46.
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In addition, Congress has periodically chosen to "subsidize" veterans'
organizations because of their very significant and important past
contributions to the country.20 8  It is not far-fetched to assume that
Congress also chose to support churches' significant contributions by not
taxing them throughout our nation's history. The historical contributions
of churches in providing essential social services suggest as much, making
it clear that churches were not intended to be included in the political
activity restrictions imposed on other section 501(c)(3) organizations.0 9
Furthermore, part of the Court's analysis in Regan rested on the fact
that the tax exempt organization could establish a section 501(c)(4)
lobbying affiliate and overcome the section 501(c)(3) lobbying
limitations, 0 but this is not a reasonable option for churches. The Code
defines a section 501(c)(4) organization as a "social welfare organization,"
which is allowed to engage in lobbying activities and still remain exempt
from taxation, although contributions to a section 501(c)(4) are not tax-
deductible for the contributor.211  However, a section 501(c)(4) lobbying
affiliate is limited in interfering in a political campaign, and thus such an
affiliate will not overcome the problems associated with the electioneering
ban. 12 The promotion of social welfare does not include participation or
intervention in political campaigns.213 Thus, a section 501(c)(4) entity is
not a satisfactory option for churches.21 4 Therefore Regan's suggestion of
501(c)(4) as an alternative is misplaced, and even if not, its reach only
208 See id. at 550-51 ("It is also not irrational for Congress to decide that, even though it will not
subsidize substantial lobbying by charities generally, it will subsidize lobbying by veterans'
organizations .... Our country has a longstanding policy of compensating veterans for their past
contributions by providing them with numerous advantages."); Robinson, supra note 159, at 359
("Because of the special status of veterans, promotion of veteran lobbying in order to enhance
legislative awareness of veteran's concerns is a substantial justification for the extension of lobbying
subsidies to the veteran's organizations."); Ellis M. West, The Free Exercise Clause and the Internal
Revenue Code's Restrictions on the Political Activity of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 21 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 395, 406 (1985-86) (acknowledging that the federal government subsidizes the political
activities of businesses, veterans' groups, and political parties).
209 See supra Part III.
210 Regan, 461 U.S. at 544.
211 I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006) (providing tax exemption for "[c]ivic leagues or organizations not
organized for profit but operated exclusively for the promotion of social welfare").
212 See HOPKINS, supra note 151, at 334 (noting that the prohibition on political campaign activities
for social welfare organizations is not absolute, and any breach may subject the organization to tax
imposed by I.R.C. § 527(f) on expenditures for political activities that come within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 527(e)(2)).
213 Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c)(4)- I (a)(2)(ii) (2005).
214 Caron & Dessingue, supra note 3, at 193 (concluding that section 501(c)(4) is not a viable
option to overcome the constitutional infirmities of the electioneering ban); Gaffney, supra note 6, at
34-35 (finding that section 501 (c)(4) does not apply to religious organizations).
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extends to the lobbying limitation. The Court has not determined whether
the electioneering ban-an absolute ban-would pass constitutional
211scrutiny.
The subsidy argument advanced in Regan is not applicable to churches
for the reasons stated above. Indeed, section 501(c)(3) regulates core
political speech on the basis of its content, and thus the most exacting
scrutiny should be required to determine whether the restrictions imposed
are narrowly tailored to promote a compelling government interest.
Therefore, the government must seek to use a less restrictive alternative
that would serve its purpose if one is available. 21 6  Content-based
regulations trample upon freedom of speech, and therefore, are strongly
presumed to be invalid.217 In applying the strict scrutiny test, the Court
determines whether there is a compelling governmental interest in limiting
speech.21 8 The government bears the burden to show that its actions of
restricting speech are constitutional. 21 9 The justification for the legislation
must come from the legislative body that passed the legislation.
The legislative history surrounding the 1934 and 1954 amendments to
section 501(c)(3) indicates that the legislature enacted the political activity
restrictions to prevent wealthy donors from advancing their personal
agendas by using "sham" section 501(c)(3) organizations and to abort
campaign funds intended for presidential nominee Johnson's opponent,
respectively. 221  Neither amendment was intended to deter political
intervention of churches in political campaigns. Thus, restricting
215 Johnson, supra note 73, at 890 (noting that the constitutionality of the electioneering ban has not
been addressed by the Supreme Court).
216 United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) ("If a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that alternative.").
217 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 591 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that content-
based regulations "are presumptively invalid abridgments of the freedom of speech").
211 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 813 ("Ifa statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly
tailored to promote a compelling Government interest."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The First Amendment:
When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV ST. L. REV. 199, 201 (1994)
(noting Justice O'Connor's opinion in Simon and Schuster, Inc. v. New York State Crime Victims
Board, wherein she stated that the First Amendment precludes content-based speech restrictions unless
the government can show that the regulation is needed to achieve a compelling government interest).
29 Playboy, 529 U.S. at 816 ("When a plausible, less restrictive alternative is offered to a content-
based speech restriction, it is the Government's obligation to prove that the alternative will be
ineffective to achieve its goals.").
220 Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 170 (2002)
(concurrence) (rejecting the dissent's reason of "crime prevention" as appropriate to uphold the
ordinance where the legislators never stated that "crime prevention" was a justification for enacting the
ordinance). But see West, supra note 208, at 406 (noting that the government interests served by
section 501 (c)(3) "are neither clear nor compelling").
221 See supra Part I(B).
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churches' speech does not satisfy the compelling governmental interest.
Moreover, as discussed throughout this article, the legislative history
clearly shows that churches were not the intended targets of the
amendment. The amendments therefore cannot pass constitutional muster
as applied to churches.
The federal government is using section 501(c)(3) to regulate what
churches can and cannot say. The political activity restrictions encroach
upon churches' freedom of speech, but this effect was never intended or
contemplated by the government. That is, from a review of the history and
development of the political activity restrictions in section 501(c)(3), 222 it
seems clear that the restrictions developed inadvertently, in an effort to
restrict the activities of wealthy donors and private foundations, not
churches. Yet the political activity restrictions-tax laws-are seriously
impacting the core values of the First Amendment.
The Sixteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution authorizes
Congress to "lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived. 223 It allows Congress to tax or not to tax, but it does not allow
Congress to restrict speech based upon content. The Sixteenth
Amendment does not authorize Congress to use the amendment to
encroach upon the fundamental rights given in the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has occasionally stated, quite unabashedly, that the
First Amendment has a special place in America, so much so that freedom
of speech presumably trumps all other amendments. 224 Free exercise has
frequently been described as America's "first freedom., 225 Although not
all Supreme Court justices have accepted this "preferred position" theory,
the Court has nevertheless accorded the First Amendment special
treatment. The Court has used various devices to express this preferred
position, as listed by one author:
222 See id.
223 U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
224 See, e.g., Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(charging other justices with preferring one First Amendment value over another); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 713 (1971) (holding that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity");
Murdock v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943) (stating that "[flreedom of
press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred position").
225 Johnson, supra note 73, at 877 (citing as examples THOMAS CURRY, THE FIRST FREEDOMS:
CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1986), and Michael W.
McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom "?, 21 CARDOzO L. REV. 1243 (2000)).
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[the] clear and present danger test; narrowing of the
presumption of constitutionality; strict construction of
statutes to avoid limitation of first amendment freedoms;
the prohibitions against prior restraint and subsequent
punishment; relaxation of the requirement of standing to
sue where first amendment issues are involved; and
generally higher standards of procedural due process
where these freedoms are in jeopardy.226
A federal tax qua tax may be a valid exercise of the taxing power, but it
may be invalid considering specific constitutional limitations, such as the
Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-incrimination. 227  Similarly,
federal taxation, though valid as a taxing power, may be invalid for
Congress to pursue under the First Amendment with respect to churches.
In other words, is the Sixteenth Amendment subject to First Amendment
limitations?
If free speech is in a preferred position under the First Amendment
because free speech is described in absolutist terms, then the Sixteenth
Amendment would certainly be subject to the First Amendment
limitations.228 In addition, most of the justices of the Supreme Court have
agreed that the values protected by the religion clauses are fundamental
principles of liberty in America and must be protected from federal and
229state interference. It stands to reason, then, that it is beyond Congress's
power to tax churches under the authority of the Sixteenth Amendment
where such taxation encroaches upon the First Amendment freedoms. 230
That is, the IRS should not be able to revoke the tax-exempt status of a
church simply because the church pastor tells the congregation not to vote
for candidate X because the candidate favors abortion or gay marriage.
Such a statement is electioneering and church doctrine.
226 Robert B. McKay, The Preference for Freedom, 34 N.Y. L. REV. 1182, 1184 (1959).
227 JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.5, at 230 (7th ed. 2004)
(citing Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)).
228 Id. at 1150-51 (suggesting that if free speech is an absolute right then it is surely in a preferred
position to those rights in the Constitution which are not expressed in absolute terms).
229 Id. at 1412 (noting that a majority of Supreme Court justices have held that "the values
protected by the religion clauses are fundamental aspects of liberty in our society and must be protected
from both state and federal interference").
230 See Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 687 (1970) (noting that since
enactment of the Sixteenth Amendment, federal income tax acts have consistently exempted charities
and churches from paying tax).
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In 1819, in his famous opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice
Marshall declared that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy. ' ' 23 1
Marshall's declaration is a truism as applied to churches-the federal
government's taxation of churches involves the power to destroy them.
B. Freedom of Religion
Not only does section 501(c)(3) encroach upon churches' freedom of
speech, but it also encroaches upon their freedom of religion, particularly
the Free Exercise Clause. In the backdrop of discussing section 501(c)(3)
and churches, one has to acknowledge that the Religion Clauses-both cast
in absolutes-tend to conflict with each other when reasonably stretched to
232their extremes. It seems, then, that there has to be some flexibility to
accommodate the proscription against governmentally established religion
or governmental interference with religion, 33 which appears to be what the
First Amendment requires. 34
The initial starting point, then, is to determine whether section 501(c)(3)
violates the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court's three-part inquiry
for testing possible violations of the Establishment Clause was laid out in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, as follows: 1) the government action must have a
secular purpose, 2) which primary purpose must not be to inhibit or
advance religion, and 3) no excessive entanglement between government
and religion must exist.2 35 However, in the religious area, entanglement is
the central foCUS.
23 6
The Court addressed the nature of government entanglement as it relates
to churches a year before establishing the Lemon test. In Walz, the Court
231 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819) (holding a state tax
unconstitutional as applied to the federal government).
232 Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69 ("The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two
Religion Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded to a logical
extreme, would tend to clash with the other.").
233 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005) ("Our decisions recognize that 'there is room for
play in the joints' between the Clauses, some space for legislative action neither compelled by the Free
Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the Establishment Clause.").
234 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 720-21 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissent) (noting that the "tension" between the Religion Clauses is fairly recent and was
unknown to the framers of the Constitution at the time of the adoption of the First Amendment).
235 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Thomas, 450 U.S. at 725
(Rehnquist, J., dissent) (noting that the Court moved from the mechanical "no-aid-to-religion"
approach and recognizing the Lemon three-part test to determine constitutionality of government aid to
religion); NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 227, at 1413-14 (concluding that the "Court in Agostini
'repackaged' the three part purpose-effect-entanglement test that had been used from 1971 to 1997").
236 Grutka v. Barbour, 549 F.2d 5, 8 (7th Cir. 1977) ("In the religious area, the essence of First
Amendment inquiry is entanglement.").
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held that the legislative purpose of property tax exemptions for churches
was neither to advance nor to inhibit religion. 37 Rather, permitting
exemptions, as compared to denying them, was the lesser intrusion upon
entanglement between church and state.238  Indeed, allowing the
exemptions actually complimented and reinforced the wall between church
and state. Thus, the Walz Court determined that tax exemptions for
churches did not violate the Establishment Clause.23 9
However, if churches are treated differently than other tax-exempt
organizations, will the Establishment Clause be violated? The answer is
probably not. Historically, churches have been treated differently, perhaps
because of their significant contributions to America and the world. Since
this country's founding, churches have been accorded a special place in
240society. In addition, the government treats churches differently with
respect to the IRS tax inquiry. The IRS has developed special rules for
churches' tax inquiries that are distinct from the rules applied to other tax-
exempt organizations.24' Congress also carved out exceptions to section
501(c)(3) for other categories of organizations, such as labor unions,242
business leagues,
243 and veterans.244
Finally, it seems that the framers of the Constitution expected that
churches would be treated differently-treated with more protection than
non-church organizations-as evidenced by the Religion Clauses. 245
Although some commentators argue that continuing to treat churches
differently may be unconstitutional,246  the opposite seems more
convincing: treating churches the same as other tax-exempt organizations,
which do not have the dual protections of the Religion Clauses, may be
237 Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
238 Id. at 675-76.
239 Id. at 680.
240 Kemmitt, supra note 3, at 154 (noting that churches are not treated similarly to other tax-exempt
entities); Murphy, supra note 5, at 69 (stating that churches are treated differently under the Code due
to their "special status" in society, but recommending that churches be treated the same as other tax-
exempt organizations under the Code).
241 Church Audit Procedures Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7611 (2004); see also Branch Ministries v. Rossotti,
211 F.3d 137, 142 (acknowledging that churches receive "unique" treatment under the I.R.C.).
242 I.R.C. § 501(c)(5) (2006).
243 I.R.C. § 501(c)(6); HOPKINS, supra note 151, at 21 (noting that the justification for business
leagues and trade organizations was that these organizations "function to promote the welfare of a
segment of society: the business, industrial, and professional community").
'" I.R.C. § 501(c)(19).
245 See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
246 Murphy, supra note 5, at 83 (concluding that legislation permitting churches to participate in
political activity may be unconstitutional). But see Zelinsky, supra note 175, at 841 (finding that tax
benefits extended solely to religious institutions "pass constitutional muster").
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unconstitutional. That secular entities are not accorded the same benefits
as churches does not mean that the Establishment Clause is violated.247
Nevertheless, laws which may violate the Establishment Clause may
nonetheless be upheld if they appear necessary to accommodate the Free
Exercise Clause.248 But section 501(c)(3) does not hold up under a Free
Exercise Clause analysis. The Court has stated that:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs,
a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may
be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.249
Section 501(c)(3), then, requires that churches choose between either
receiving a tax exemption, on the one hand, or discussing social and moral
issues during campaign periods or discussing religious issues that have an
impact on current public policy. The government's limitation on lobbying
and absolute ban on electioneering is clearly an infringement of-a burden
upon-the Free Exercise Clause.
In order to satisfy the First Amendment, the government must show that
legislation which encroaches on religion is the least restrictive means to
achieve a compelling governmental interest. As stated earlier, the history
of section 501(c)(3) shows that the legislature enacted the political activity
restrictions to prevent wealthy donors from advancing their personal
agendas by using "sham" section 501(c)(3) organizations and to abort the
campaign funds of presidential nominee Johnson's opponent, but that the
restrictions were not intended to include churches. The restrictions
preclude churches from fully engaging in the political process as they had
been doing before, during, and after the 1934 and 1954 amendments.
Thus, section 501(c)(3) as applied to churches is not the least restrictive
247 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (finding that religious accommodations need not
come bundled with benefits to secular entities); see also Schwarz, supra note 3, at 57 ("[C]hurches
should enjoy no special immunity from these limitations apart from a certain sensitivity to their status
under the First Amendment.").
248 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 n.51 (1989) ("Government efforts to
accommodate religion are permissible when they remove burdens on the free exercise of religion.").
249 Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981).
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means to achieve the purposes behind the enactments of the two
amendments. 250  A less restrictive avenue would be for the IRS to enforce
section 501(c)(3) against these donors who are using the tax code as a
"sham" to receive tax deductions to which they are not entitled.
V. RECOMMENDATION
The United States Constitution declares that "Congress shall make no
law . . abridging the freedom of speech., 251  Buckley and Randall
maintain that political speech, including political contributions, is a core
American value which Congress cannot regulate unless to prevent
corruption. 2  Allowing Congress to condition the grant of tax exemptions
on the surrender of a constitutional right is constitutionally infirm. 3
History confirms that the political activity restrictions enacted in 1934
and 1954 developed inadvertently. 254 As stated earlier, Congress imposed
the political activity restrictions for reasons other than to preclude churches
from full and open participation in the political process. 55 Congress did
not intend for either enactment to apply to churches.256 Indeed, during both
enactments, churches were intricately involved in the American political
251process, without limitations. Churches' intimate involvement in politics
250 Gaffney, supra note 6, at 37 (stating that it is hard to find a more restrictive ban than an
"absolute prohibition on any participation by a 501(c)(3) organization in a political campaign").
251 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
252 See supra Part IV.
253 CARTER, supra note 21, at 215-16 (disagreeing with the notion that it is the state's
responsibility, acting through the tax code, to protect religions from themselves); West, supra note 208,
at 406 (allowing tax exemptions is an attempt by the government to do indirectly what it could not do
directly). As Richard Rubin argues,
The main basis for judicial hostility toward unconstitutional conditions is that a
government should not be allowed to do indirectly what it may not do directly-
prevent the exercise of constitutional rights. This idea becomes increasingly
persuasive in an age where an ever expanding bounty of governmentally granted
privileges and benefits are dispersed to a significant percentage of the
populace .... To allow modern governments to exact, as the price of obtaining
these benefits, the waiver of constitutional rights would be to allow government
a substantial power to buy up unpopular rights.
Richard L. Rubin, Note, The Resurrection of the Right-Privilege Distinction? A Critical Look at
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has contributed to the marketplace of ideas in society, which is what the
Court seeks to encourage by its unforgiving conditions placed on content-
based restrictions of political speech and other high-value speech.
Although the restrictions were enacted to avoid improper donor activity,
the IRS looks solely to the donee's activity in the IRS's application,
enforcement, and interpretation of section 501(c)(3).2 58 This approach is
inappropriate. The IRS should enforce section 501(c)(3) against donors-
individuals or organizational-who are using the tax code as a "sham" to
receive tax deductions to which they are not entitled. That is the only
legitimate argument for section 501(c)(3): apply it to the original intended
targets that prompted the enactment of the political activity restrictions.
Churches were not the original intended targets.
In further support of this recommendation, the IRS has found that most
churches do not violate the political activities restrictions, which is why
there have been few IRS church audits.259  Thus, the time, money, and
scholarly analyses devoted to aggressively attacking churches seem
misplaced.
Finally, according to one scholar, many individuals who give to
churches can deduct these contributions, but most church donors do not
itemize their income tax deductions. 260  Thus, because church donors
choose to take the standard deduction, they do not enjoy the benefit of a
tax break.261 More interestingly, taxpayers in the low-income brackets are
the most likely to contribute to churches. 262 Therefore, the "targets" who
prompted the enactment of the political activity restrictions-wealthy
donors and a private foundation comprised of "some of the richest men in
the country"-are not those who are most affected by the political activity
263restrictions. Wealthy donors contribute more often to hospitals,
258 Note, Tax Treatment of Lobbying Expenses and Contribution, 67 HARv. L. REV. 1408, 1413
(1954) ("Though it seems improper to determine these tax consequences by solely mechanical criteria,
a literal reading of the Code seems to permit no other result since section 23(o), in classifying
contributions, looks only to the donee's activity.").
259 Everson, supra note 7 (stating that most churches do not engage in politicking). But see
Murphy, supra note 5, at 68 (stating that the IRS performs few audits because they seek to respect free
speech and freedom of religion).
260 Ellen P. Aprill, Churches, Politics, and the Charitable Contribution Deduction, 42 B.C.L. REV.
843, 845 (2001).
261 id.
262 Id. at 846.
263 O'Daniel, supra note 3, at 758 n.I 10.
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museums, and the arts.264  Thus, the political activity restrictions are not
narrowly tailored to achieve the legislative goal.
The federal government must seek to resolve this tax problem-
America's tax problem-in terms of what is constitutional for the
government to do and not to do. Section 501(c)(3) places content-based
restrictions on political speech. That the Court has labeled tax exemptions
a "subsidy" seems too "conclusory and unconvincing., 265  IRS audits of
churches for proscribed political activity present serious entanglement
problems, which supports the Walz Court's acceptance of property tax
exemptions for churches as a lesser form of entanglement between church
and state.266 Actual IRS enforcement of the political activity restrictions
would seem to excessively entangle church and state.267 The United States
cannot allow freedom of speech and religion to be chilled simply because it
has a tax problem.
This article recommends total exclusion of churches from section
501 (c)(3) and its political activity restrictions because the Court attempts to
avoid constitutional issues when it is able to do so. 268 Acknowledging the
historical development of section 501(c)(3)-that churches were never
intended to be included within section 501(c)(3)-would avoid
unconstitutional encroachment on the First Amendment.
Other commentators have recommended various proposals to solve
America's tax problem with regard to section 501(c)(3) and churches.
Some of the suggestions call for clarifying and limiting the scope of the
political activity restrictions,269 rejecting any legislation that seeks to
264 Aprill, supra note 260, at 846.
265 Zelinsky, supra note 175, at 841.
266 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
267 See Alan L. Feld, Rendering Unto Caesar or Electioneering for Caesar? Loss of Church Tax
Exemption for Participation in Electoral Politics, 42 B.C. L. REV. 931, 938-39 (2001) (stating that the
enforcement of the electioneering restriction would create undue entanglements).
268 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (stating that the Court
abides by "a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a large part of all the constitutional
questions pressed upon it for decision").
269 See, e.g., Feld, supra note 267, at 939; see also Joel E. Davidson, Note, Religion in Politics and
the Income Tax Exemption, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 397, 423 (1973-74) (suggesting that section
501(c)(3) should be revised to create "more reasonable standards;" that Congress should revise the
individual contributor's deduction so that no deductions would be given for donations to tax-exempt
organizations where their lobbying could result in legislation that may advance the economic interests
of the donee; and that deductions be allowable only where the donor stipulated that the donation not be
used for lobbying or only used for certain exempt purposes); James, supra note 150, at 74 (suggesting
the elimination of the ambiguous term "substantial part" in the lobbying limitation and insertion of a
clear definition of what constitutes participation or intervention in a political campaign); Judy Ann
Rosenblum, Note, Religion and Political Campaigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the
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overturn the political campaign ban, 270 or narrowly construing the political
campaign restrictions in certain circumstances.27' Other commentators
recommend allowing a bright-line test that allows churches to engage in
partisan activity but does not allow use of tax-exempt funds to support
partisan activity,272 thoroughly redrafting sections 501 and 170,273 and
reconsidering the political activity restrictions because they violate the
Free Speech and Free Exercise clauses of the First Amendment.274 One
scholar proposed no solution "other than caution.,
27 5
Scholars, Congress, and other interested parties will likely continue to
propose solutions to America's tax problem until it is solved. And they
should, because by a slight margin the majority of Americans believe that
"churches and other houses of worship should express their views on day-
to-day social and political questions. 2 76 The fact remains, however, that
peculiar problems arise when applying the political activity restrictions to
churches because the restrictions were never intended to apply to them.
This article concludes that, based upon an historical and constitutional
analysis, section 501(c)(3) does not apply to churches at all. Rather than
taxing churches, the IRS should instead enforce section 501(c)(3) against
donors seeking to advance their individual agendas through donations and
should also disallow particular contributions by individual donors
receiving tax exemptions, rather than taxing churches. In short, the donors
should lose their tax exemptions, not the churches.
VI. CONCLUSION
From an historical and constitutional perspective, section 501 (c)(3) was
never intended to apply to churches. The application of this section of the
Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 536, 555-60 (1981) (suggesting that the law be revised to
allow separate tax treatment for religious organizations).
270 Murphy, supra note 5, at 75-83.
271 Johnson, supra note 73, at 899.
272 Kemmitt, supra note 3, at 179-80.
273 Donna D. Adler, The Internal Revenue Code, The Constitution, And The Courts: The Use Of
Tax Expenditure Analysis In Judicial Decision Making, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 855, 916-17 (1993)
(likening tax exemptions to direct spending and analyzing such under the Constitution).
274 Gaffney, supra note 6, at 50-51.
275 Gamett, supra note 15, at 802.
276 Press Release, The Pew Research Center, Religion and Politics: Religion A Strength and
Weakness for Both Parties 13 (Aug. 30, 2005), available at http://pewforum.org/publications
/surveys/religion-politics-05.pdf (reporting also that less than a majority of Americans believe that
clergy should discuss issues or political candidates from the pulpit, but support for this practice among
Americans is greater now than it was forty years ago).
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Code to churches ignores history and tramples churches' rights under the
First Amendment. Constitutional red flags should be raised in the
government's regulation of churches' expression, but not the churches'
expression itself.277 The government can say what is deductible and what
is not, but it cannot dictate what is religious. If the government is
concerned with what is deductible, then it should address tax deductions,
not speech content. The government also should not regulate speech
content through taxation. As one commentator has noted, "It should not be
for the state to label as electioneering, endorsement, or lobbying what a
religious community considers evangelism, worship, or witness. 278
Instead of trying to determine the parameters of religion, the courts,
Congress, and the federal government should focus on ensuring that
section 501 (c)(3) is not being abused by donors-wealthy donors-seeking
to use it for their personal agendas. After all, that was the original purpose
behind the enactment of the political activity restrictions in section
501(c)(3).279
277 Richard W. Gamett, Campaigning From the Pulpit: Why Not?, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2006,
available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/opinion/editorials/2006-04-16-forum-religion x.htm.
278 id.
279 The author recognizes that there are several other issues surrounding section 501(c)(3) that
affect charities and churches, such as the claim that section 501(c)(3) standards are vague, are
overbroad, and encourage selective enforcement by the IRS (which may consider re-organizing itself as
an independent agency rather than remaining an executive agency to avoid partisan politics), but those
issues are outside the scope of this article.
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